‘Had we used the Navy’s bare fist instead of its gloved hand’: The absence of coastal assault vessels in the Royal Navy by 1914 by Fuller, Howard
COASTAL	ASSAULT	VESSELS	IN	THE	ROYAL	NAVY 
 
78                                             www.bjmh.org.uk 
‘Had we used the Navy’s bare fist instead of its 
gloved hand…’ - The Absence of Coastal Assault 
Vessels in the Royal Navy by 19141 
 
HOWARD J. FULLER 




This paper will briefly chart how and why the Royal Navy chose not to 
develop coastal assault vessels—namely heavy-gunned, light-draught 
monitors specially designed to absorb damage from modern mines or 
torpedoes—until well after the First World War began. Churchill and 
Fisher envisaged these particular men-of-war as the floating equivalent of 
tanks, both ‘intended to restore to the stronger power an effective means 
of the offensive’. Only when they were finally launched and deployed in 
sufficient numbers could serious plans for projecting power directly 
against the German coastline be safely considered. So where were the 
monitors before the war? 
 
 
As I went away, [Churchill] stopped me, saying he wished to talk about some matters. Said, 
“Now we have our war. The next thing is to decide how we are going to carry it on.” What 
a statement! 
 
— Arthur J. Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral: Life and Papers of Sir Herbert 
Richmond (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952), entry dated 4 August, 1914 
 
 
A vital yet relatively unnoticed connecting factor between two sprawling, ‘total war’ 
historical conflicts, the American Civil War (1861-1865) and the First World War 
                                                
1 An original version of this paper was delivered at ‘The First World War at Sea, 
1914-1919’ conference, National Maritime Museum (Greenwich), 3-4 June 2016. My 
thanks go to the two external peer reviewers for their very useful comments, and to 
Dr Ian Buxton for help with my questions regarding British monitors of the First 
World War and their ‘inshore riskability’ as he’s termed it.  
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(1914-1918), has been the ‘issue’ of modern coastal offence and defence, and in 
particular the stand-out presence of monitor warships. In both cases, monitors were 
meant to be unique, war-winning vessels—able to go where other men-of-war 
couldn’t, brushing off or avoiding enemy coastal defences, and delivering irresistible 
firepower with unheard-of precision. The Northern states invested heavily in these 
state-the-art vessels primarily for coast defence—against Confederate ironclads, for 
example. But the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914, Winston Churchill, and 
Admiral Sir John (‘Jackie’) Fisher, the First Sea Lord, saw them as ideal for coastal 
assault—for shore bombardment—carrying in some cases a pair of 15-inch calibre 
guns in a heavily-armoured turret, yet mounted on a minimalised hull which drew 
only 10½-feet of water (whereas the new super-dreadnought Queen Elizabeth, by 
contrast, floated eight of the same guns in 33-feet of water at a minimum.) By 
hugging the shore as close as possible, accuracy against enemy batteries was 
maximised, while shallows offered greater protection from various deep-water 
threats, from U-boats to battleships. To answer the deadly threat of enemy 
torpedoes and mines, Admiralty designers fitted these littoral craft with extra 
internal watertight compartments along with exaggerated ‘blisters’ or ‘bulges’ along 
their outer hulls which might absorb the impact of underwater explosions. In many 
respects they were the toughest ships of the First World War.  
 
Expectations were high, perhaps too high given the circumstances. Would an 
unexpected surge of war-time technology and shipbuilding be enough to overcome 
the strategic inertia of the Western Front by suddenly allowing for major strikes 
from the sea? Churchill certainly seems to have thought so, and he did his best to 
convince anyone who would listen. ‘I hope you will not be discouraged by the recall 
of the Queen Elizabeth’, he wrote to Admiral John de Robeck in the midst of the 
Gallipoli Campaign. While it was increasingly unsafe for the Admiral’s flagship due to 
enemy mines and submarines, two large monitors were on their way to replace her 
which ‘will go anywhere and you will be able to use them with freedom’, he assured 
him. ‘They are the last word in bombarding vessels’.2 By June 1915 Churchill had 
been squeezed out of office yet still clung to Prime Minister Asquith’s new coalition 
government as the obscure Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Here he confided 
to his younger brother ‘Jack’ how the big monitors ‘are another source of hope for 
me’. Their ultimate success would be his ultimate success. Since their constructors 
were confident of their ability to withstand torpedoes it might just be the one 
                                                
2 CHAR 13/65/214, from the Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill 
College, University of Cambridge, Churchill to de Robeck, 12 May 1915. Within 
hours of this telegram the older pre-dreadnought battleship HMS Goliath was daringly 
attacked at anchor off Cape Helles (the Gallipoli beachhead) by a lone Turkish 
destroyer, and sunk with a loss of more than 80% of her crew. 
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innovation which could transform the war at sea (not just specialised armoured units 
for coastal assault, but capital ships in the line of battle and even oceangoing 
merchant vessels virtually immune from U-boat attacks.) ‘One cannot be quite 
certain till you try!’ 3  At Churchill’s insistence the Royal Navy was now fully 
committed. After another year of war, with casualties piling up on both land and sea 
faster than anyone thought possible, Churchill was back in Parliament from a sort of 
self-imposed exile serving on the Western Front—promising Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle that the navy’s monitors, like the army’s new tanks, would undoubtedly 
‘restore to the stronger power an effective means of the offensive’.4 Implicit here 
was the notion that the war would be lost on the defensive, relying solely upon a 
maritime blockade to slowly eat away the Central Powers from within, while the 
British Grand Fleet served to deter the German High Seas Fleet; glaring at one 
another from their respective bases on opposite sides of the North Sea.  
 
Rather, the new British monitors were to ultimately spearhead an invasion of the 
Baltic, in combination with a new wave of ‘light-draft’, super-fast battlecruisers. HMS 
Furious was herself to be armed with a pair of stupendous 18-inch calibre, 149-ton 
guns, the largest ever mounted in the long history of the British navy, and capable of 
firing a 3,320-pound (or 1½-ton) projectile 28,900 yards. As Fisher described it, the 
guns of his monster flotilla ‘with their enormous shells were built to make it 
impossible for the Germans to prevent the Russians from landing on the Pomeranian 
coast’, with British naval shells ‘bursting on reaching the ground far out of human 
sight, but yet with exact accuracy as to where they should fall, causing in their 
explosion craters somewhat like that of Vesuvius or Mount Etna; and consequently 
                                                
3 19 June 1915, Winston to John Churchill, in Martin Gilbert (ed.), Winston S. 
Churchill, Companion Volume III, Part 2, May 1915 - December 1916 (London: 
Heinemann, 1972), p. 1042. FISR 7-4, for torpedo-proof ships see for example, B. 
Hopkinson (Board of Invention and Research), Report on the Protection of Ships against 
Torpedo Attack, from the Papers of 1st Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 21 October 1915, 
Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge; and 
MS72/030, DEY/19, Eustice T. D’Eyncourt (Director of Naval Construction) to Lloyd 
George, 14 June 1917, the D’Eyncourt Papers, National Maritime Museum 
(Greenwich), Caird Library. The Admiralty ultimately rejected the proposal for 
merchant vessels to be provided with more watertight bulkheads; see for example, 
The National Archives, Kew (hereafter ‘TNA’), ADM 1-8507-280, ‘Unsinkable 
Ships—Proceedings of an International Conference held at the Admiralty in August 
1917 to discuss and consider designs for unsinkable ships’. 
4 1 October 1916, Churchill to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, from Gilbert, Churchill, vol. 
III, Pt. 2, op. cit., p. 1572. 
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you can easily imagine the German Army fleeing for its life from Pomerania to 
Berlin’.5  
 
This was, to be sure, an awe-inspiring vision, but as with Churchill’s unrelenting 
optimism it has to be tempered with the recollection of the naval repulse at the 
Dardanelles or the disastrous Gallipoli campaign which followed, and even going 
much further back than previous analyses have allowed. After all, the original 
‘Monitor’ was an American invention, first used by the Union Navy during the 
American Civil War half a century earlier. 6  Designed by the brilliant Swedish 
immigrant John Ericsson, the famous USS Monitor (1862) as a ‘sub-aquatic system of 
warfare’ had its origins further back still, in the Crimean War (1853-1856). In that 
conflict, Great Britain and France as ‘maritime states’ joined their forces against 
Imperial Russia, which Prince Albert adroitly described as a ‘a vast and ponderous 
mass, upon which blows on the few spots where they can be planted will make no 
deep impression’. 7  The Allies’ strategic dilemma was compounded by both the 
political desire and strong public pressure to root out the main Russian battlefleet, 
holed up in the naval fortress-base of Cronstadt in the Gulf of Finland, guarding the 
seaward approaches to St. Petersburg. By quickly annihilating the growing threat of 
Russian seapower in either the Baltic or the Black Sea, the Ottoman Empire would 
be protected from Russian dismemberment, Russian expansionism north and south 
would be checked, and the Mediterranean would remain a predominantly Anglo-
French sphere of influence. But by the 1850s Cronstadt was the most heavily-
defended port in the world, with a network of modern granite forts—armed with 
shell-firing guns—which funnelled wooden steamships through multiple cross-fires at 
close range. Soon, additional shore batteries were established to protect newly-laid 
minefields in the channel approaches from any attempts at demolition.8  
                                                
5 From Oscar Parkes, British Battleships: A History of Design, Construction and Armament 
(London: Seeley Service & Co., Limited, 1970), p. 618. There was nothing to say that 
the ‘90 miles’ from the Pomeranian coast direct to Berlin would not have become a 
nightmare for advancing Russian and/or British troops; at least one major river line 
flowing into the Oder blocked the advance; a potential German ‘Miracle of the 
Marne’? 
6 See for example, Richard H. Thompson, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Monitor 1862-
1973’, Mariner’s Mirror, vol. 60, no. 3 (1974), pp. 293-310. 
7 24 January 1854, Prince Albert to Baron von Stockmar, in Kurt Jagow (ed.), Letters 
of the Prince Consort 1831-1861 (London: John Murray, 1938), p. 207. 
8 For various British reports on Russian ‘infernal machines’ see Sir Charles Napier 
Papers, British National Archives (Kew), PRO 30-16, 5; TNA, ADM 1-5674, 4 
February 1856; TNA, ADM 1-5677, Foreign Office to Admiralty, 23 February 1856 
(information clandestinely supplied via the Swedish Minister at St. Petersburg, 
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To fix this problem, Ericsson submitted to French Emperor Napoleon III in 1854 a 
plan for a light-draft, iron-hulled, mastless, fully steam-powered, screw-propelled, 
partially-submerged and iron-armoured craft—armed with two large, ship-killing 
weapons mounted in a heavily plated, steam-rotated iron turret. ‘An impregnable and 
partially submerged instrument for destroying ships of war has been one of the 
hobbies of my life’, he later recounted.9 A squadron of them might steam through the 
Russian gauntlet of fire, sink all of the wooden ships-of-the-line found sheltering in 
the harbour with singular knock-out blows rather than broadsides, then steam back 
out safely enough. Of course, this plan said nothing about dealing with mines or 
other obstructions—or pounding forts into submission—and the design of the vessel 
itself was so completely radical to anything seen in a professional navy before that it’s 
perhaps little surprise the French rejected the proposal (one of many received during 
the war).10 Instead the Emperor pushed ahead with shallow-draft, fully-armoured 
broadside-batteries whose main function was to attack the Russian forts at close 
range; stone against iron, not iron against wood.11 
 
                                                                                                                 
General Nordin). Desperate for any solution to the problem of naval mines and 
obstructions, Prime Minister Lord Palmerston wished First Lord of the Admiralty Sir 
Charles Wood to explore shipbuilder John Scott Russell’s radical proposal for a 
‘submarine vessel, or locomotive Diving Bell’; 17 December 1855, Halifax Papers 
(Hickleton), Borthwick Institute of Archives, York University, A4-63. For Russian 
descriptions of minefields around Cronstadt and around the Gulf of Finland 
(including those developed by Alfred Nobel for the Russian government) see 
RGAVMF, fond 224, op. 1, Letters of Konstantin Nikolaevich, St. Petersburg National 
Archives; delo 289. 
9 William Conant Church, The Life of John Ericsson, 2 volumes (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1906), vol. 1, p. 240. 
10 Ibid., p. 241. The French letter of refusal noted ‘the Emperor thinks that the result 
to be obtained would not be proportionate to the expenses or to the small number 
of guns which could be brought into use’. Other plans for attacking Cronstadt and 
Sevastopol during the Crimean War included the use of gas attacks, submarines and 
36-inch calibre wrought-iron mortars weighing 42 tons. 
11 For the role played by the three French ironclad batteries against the Russian forts 
at Kinburn (17 October 1855) see for example TNA, ADM 1-5654, report of Rear-
Admiral Edmund Lyons to the Board of Admiralty, 23 October 1855; and David K. 
Brown, Before the Ironclad: Development of Ship Design, Propulsion and Armament in the 
Royal Navy, 1815-1860 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1990), p. 158. 
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Six years later, during the American Civil War, and Ericsson’s design had intrigued 
the U.S. Navy, desperate for a way to counter the Confederate ironclad being 
converted from the wreck of the steam-frigate USS Merrimack. When asked to 
actually name his contracted warship, then nearing completion in January 1862, 
Ericsson stated ‘The impregnable and aggressive character of this structure will 
admonish the leaders of the Southern Rebellion that the batteries on the banks of 
their rivers will no longer present barriers to the entrance of the Union forces. The 
iron-clad intruder will thus prove a severe monitor to those leaders’. Here was the 
original mission again: steaming inexorably into fortified areas and destroying enemy 
naval threats. But now he added another role which his ‘Monitor’ might fulfil like no 
other man-of-war could; promising that it was not just as a ‘severe monitor’ to ‘the 
leaders of the Southern Rebellion’ but to ‘Downing Street’ and the ‘Lords of the 
Admiralty’.12 This reflected the Anglo-American tensions during the conflict, and U.S. 
fears that the Northern States were vulnerable to attack by the latest ocean-going 
broadside-ironclads (like HMS Warrior and her sisters) from Britain or France. The 
Monitor and her sisters were specifically designed to counter such threats, by 
sacrificing ocean-going qualities (namely sails, as well as huge hulls and high-
freeboard) in favour of light-draft, armour concentration along the low-freeboard 
‘raft’, and heavily-armoured, steam-rotated gun turrets housing ‘monster’ muzzle-
loaders which no other vessels could float with safety much less operate by hand.13 
Ericsson had successfully pitched them as the one thing which could enforce the 
blockade of the Confederacy. He also stressed they were the Union’s only means of 
coping with possible European intervention by sea.  
 
What he did not claim was that they would be good for duking it out with forts. ‘I 
cannot share in your confidence relative to the capture of Charleston’, Ericsson 
wrote to the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Navy in April 1863. ‘I am so much in the 
habit of estimating force and resistance that I cannot feel sanguine of success. If you 
do succeed, it will not be a mechanical consequence of your ‘marvellous’ vessels, but 
because you are marvellously fortunate. The most I dare hope is that the contest will 
end without the loss of that prestige which your Iron Clads have conferred on the 
                                                
12 20 January 1862, Ericsson to Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Navy, Gustavus Vasa 
Fox, quoted from John Ericsson, Contributions to the Centennial Exhibition (New York: 
Nation Press, 1876), pp. 465-6. 
13 See Howard J. Fuller, ‘“This country now occupies the vantage ground”: Union 
Monitors vs. the British Navy’, in Harold Holzer and Tim Mulligan (eds.), The Battle of 
Hampton Roads: New Perspectives on the USS Monitor and CSS Virginia (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2006), pp. 125-139. 
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Nation abroad... A single shot will sink a Ship while a hundred rounds cannot silence 
a fort’.14 
 
Yet given all of the hype, expense and expectation going into ‘Yankee monitors’ by 
1863 U.S. Navy war planners tended to dismiss these warnings. Ericsson’s 
professional reputation was one thing, but only those at the top of the naval chain of 
command were aware of the growing political and pressure to crush the 
Confederate States quickly, and by any means possible. By 1863 this had included the 
emancipation of slaves in states in rebellion. Surely the North’s immense superiority 
in maritime, industrial, financial and technological resources could be harnessed and 
focused into devastating coastal strikes, led by Ericsson’s ‘floating fighting machines’ 
as he now called them. On 7 April, 1863 the Union deployed a squadron of 
improved monitors mounting gigantic 25-ton, 15-inch calibre (muzzle-loaded) 
smoothbores against the multiple array of forts and batteries which guarded the 
main shipping channel into Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. After enduring an 
incredible two-hour barrage from close range the Federal fleet was compelled to 
withdraw.15 This humiliating defeat should not have come as much of a surprise, 
                                                
14 10 April 1863, Ericsson to Fox, John Ericsson Papers, American-Swedish Historical 
Foundation, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Six months before, and with new and 
improved monitors mounting larger ordnance still under construction, Ericsson had 
also warned that ‘that the number of 15 inch guns rather than the number of vessels 
will decide your success against the Stone forts’; 30 September 1862, Ericsson to 
Fox, John Ericsson Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (Washington, 
D.C.). 
15 For the Union naval repulse at Charleston (7 April 1863) see for example, Rear-
Admiral C. R. P. Rodgers, ‘Du Pont’s Attack at Charleston’, in Robert Underwood 
Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel (eds.), Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols. 
(Edison: Castle Books, 1956, reprint of 1884-88 original series), vol. 4, pp. 32-46; E. 
Milby Burton, The Siege of Charleston, 1861-1865 (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1970); Kevin J. Weddle, Lincoln’s Tragic Admiral: The Life of Samuel 
Francis Du Pont (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005); Rowena Reed, 
Combined Operations in the Civil War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978), 
especially pp. 263-294; and Robert Erwin Johnson, ‘Ships Against Forts: Charleston, 7 
April 1863’, The American Neptune, vol. 57, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 123-35. See also 
‘Order of battle and plan of attack upon Charleston, South Carolina’, in Report of the 
Secretary of the Navy in Relation to Armored Vessels (Washington: Government Printing 
Office: 1864), pp. 60-1. The Union ironclad squadron consisted of seven Passaic-class 
monitors, the lightly-armoured, fixed tower USS Keokuk, and the broadside-ironclad 
USS New Ironsides. At less than 1,000 yards they absorbed 520 hits from heavy 
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however, since no professional navy in the mid-Victorian era had a standing doctrine 
of how to cope with modern combined coast defences; forts and shore batteries 
armed with the latest rifled, shell-firing guns but also harbour and river obstructions 
protected by mines (or ‘torpedoes’) which were protected in turn by the forts. A 
central question posed by this article is, did anyone have one in place even 
throughout the Edwardian era? As one Prussian mercenary-engineer in service of the 
Confederacy wrote after the Civil War, ‘artillery-fire alone will never again prevent a 
steam-fleet from forcing a passage, the channel of which has not been obstructed’, 
but ‘in connection with other obstructions, the torpedo [mine] renders it impossible 
for any fleet to force a passage under the fire of properly constructed shore-
batteries’.16 
 
While monitor warships during the American Civil War did perform very well 
against enemy ironclads, using them against forts was a mixed affair, inasmuch as one 
needed, in addition to monitors blasting away at short ranges, a large bombarding 
fleet going at it from a safer distance—and a good division or so of troops making an 
assault at the same time. That is, modern combined defences required modern 
combined operations to even think about overcoming. The U.S. Navy’s only 
broadside-ironclad, USS New Ironsides, therefore operated throughout the war at a 
high premium, and this highlighted a strategic dichotomy in early ironclad warship 
design between ‘turret and broadside’, and vessels for coastal offence (vs. forts) and 
those for coastal defence (vs. ships). As expressed by George Belknap, former 
executive officer of the New Ironsides and then commander of the monitor USS 
Canonicus, ‘Both classes of vessels were incomparable in their own way, and both 
classes should have been equally tested; and while perhaps the enemy dreaded the 
approach of the ‘Ironsides’ more than the united efforts of half a dozen monitors, 
the latter, with their 15-inch guns, would probably have made short work of the 
frigate’.17 
                                                                                                                 
seacoast guns including 10-inch Columbiads. Keokuk was riddled, sinking the next 
day, but none of the monitors’ armour was penetrated by gunfire and their damages 
were mostly repaired within days; see Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Navies in the War of the Rebellion (‘ORN’) 30 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1894-
1922), Series 1, vol. 14, pp. 10-24. 
16 Victor Ernst Karl Rudolf von Scheliha, A Treatise on Coast-Defence (London: E. & F. 
N. Spon, 1868), p. 48 & p. 295; also p. 157. Von Scheliha was made Lieutenant-
Colonel and Chief Engineer of the Department of the Gulf of Mexico, Confederate 
States Army, and writing from Berlin, dedicated his volume to Prince Adalbert of 
Prussia. 
17 George E. Belknap, ‘Reminiscent of the ‘New Ironsides’ off Charleston’, United 
Service Magazine, no. 1, January 1879, pp. 63-82. 
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When the double-turreted USS Miantonomoh safely crossed the Atlantic in 1866 and 
dropped anchor at Portsmouth, the Lords of the Admiralty were finally persuaded to 
invest in a few monitors, adding a ‘breastwork’ to at least bring the guns more safely 
away from the waterline. 18  Before then, Britain’s initial reaction to Ericsson’s 
‘Monitor’ had been one of disdain, then alarm, then disdain again.19 There was simply 
no question that the Royal Navy was going to substitute what the U.S. Navy was 
beginning to call a ‘Brown Water’ force for a proper ‘Blue Water’ naval power with 
a global maritime empire to protect. At home, Parliament had already committed 
itself to a large and expensive series of coastal defence forts insisted upon by ‘Old 
Pam’—Prime Minister Lord Palmerston—in 1860. This was in response to the 
popular ‘Panic’ over a possible French invasion, facilitated by steam-powered 
troopships as well as ironclad batteries, but also to the recent fate of Sevastopol (and 
the strength of Cronstadt) during the Crimean War.20 Embarrassment meanwhile 
characterised Palmerston’s last government as it seemed unwilling to follow through 
with vague threats of war over Prussia and Austria’s invasion of Denmark during the 
Schleswig-Holstein conflict (1864). ‘We should be laughed at if we stood by’ wrote 
Palmerston to the Duke of Somerset, First Lord of the Admiralty. The Channel 
Squadron ‘ought to have orders to prevent any Invasion of, or attack upon Jutland 
and Copenhagen’. Not ‘sending the Fleet’, Earl Russell, the Foreign Secretary 
similarly warned, ‘would make the Germans indulge more than ever in their sneer at 
                                                
18 Designed by Chief Constructor of the Royal Navy Edward Reed, there were two 
double-turreted Cerberus-class monitors commissioned for overseas colonial 
defence, Cerberus (launched 1868, sent to Melbourne) and Magdala (1870, sent to 
Bombay); the smaller Abyssinia (1870, sent to Bombay); the fixed-turret Hotspur 
(1870); the single turreted Glatton (1871) and Rupert (1872); and the four double-
turreted Cyclops-class monitors, all launched in 1871, Cyclops, Gorgon, Hecate and 
Hydra: ten light-draught monitors total (although Rupert drew over 22-feet), only 
seven available for service in European waters. By contrast the Union Navy during 
the Civil War laid down fifty-five monitors (coastal, ‘ultra-light’ and seagoing) with 
another five for river service only. 
19 See for example, Howard J. Fuller, ‘“The whole character of maritime life”: British 
Reactions to the U.S.S. Monitor and the American Ironclad Experience’, The Mariner’s 
Mirror, vol. 88, no. 3. (August 2002), pp. 285-300. 
20 The leading work on ‘Palmerston’s Follies’ remains Michael Stephen Partridge, 
Military Planning for the Defence of the United Kingdom, 1814-1870 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1989); more recently see Timothy Crick, Ramparts of Empire: The 
Fortifications of Sir William Jervois, Royal Engineer, 1821-1897 (Exeter: The Exeter Press 
Ltd., 2012). 
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our pacific bluster, and the harmless roar of the British Lion’.21 But unless France—
with her army—was willing to join Britain then all talk of using force was 
meaningless, Somerset observed (and the French foreign minister had already stated 
France was ‘not prepared’). Furthermore, he explained, the Royal Navy’s battlefleet 
of deep-draught broadside-ironclads were ‘not suited to purposes of [close] 
blockade, if such a measure should be resorted to, than lighter wooden vessels’. 
Since the banks of the Elbe would be in possession of Germany ‘the only possible 
operation here would be a blockade’ of Cuxhaven by ironclads supporting gunboats. 
But because the ‘south bank of the Eider’ would also be commanded by shore 
batteries, direct coastal assault was ‘impossible for small wooden ships, and the 
depth of water would not admit our iron-clad ships’.22 The popular British satire 
periodical Punch attempted to downplay the significance of the sacrifice of Denmark 
for the ‘greater peace of Europe’, as Russell later rationalised it, with a 2 July, 1864 
cartoon of ‘Jack on the Crisis’. Here a jolly jack tar of the Royal Navy gestures with a 
mate to a rustic-looking German, without a navy to fight on the open high seas, 
colonies to gobble up or trade to ruin: ‘Blow it, Bill! We can’t be expected to fight a 
lot o’ lubberly swabs like him. We’ll kick ’em, if that’ll do’. But the German is gazing 
away in another direction, puffing his pipe in contemplation and, can we perhaps 
suggest, equally dismissive?23 
 
Despite the obvious need for a new generation of light-draft armoured vessels to 
take the place of vulnerable wooden gunboats, the Royal Navy’s early monitors of 
the late 1860s had been relegated as third-class naval units even before they were 
laid down, routinely left for last in yearly naval estimates as floating batteries to 
supplement Britain’s national and imperial chain of harbour fortifications. Admiral Sir 
Sydney Robert Fremantle described his early service aboard one of these ‘small old 
freak-battleships’, HMS Hotspur, launched in 1870; ‘one of several coastguard ships 
(usually known as “gobbies”) stationed at ports round the coast of the United 
Kingdom’. More often commanded by officers pushing retirement, these awkward, 
uncomfortable vessels rarely put to sea.24 Yet they carried the heaviest guns available 
                                                
21 D/RA/A/2A/40, Palmerston to Somerset, 20 February 1864; Russell to Somerset, 
11 June 1864, Somerset Papers Collection, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire Record 
Office; D/RA/A/2A/53, Letters from Viscount Palmerston, 1864, Letters from Lord 
John Russell, 1864. 
22 PRO 30-22, 27; TNA, PRO 30-22, 26, 26 January 1864, Somerset minute; 10 and 
15 January 1864, Somerset to Russell, National Archives (Kew), Russell Papers. 
23 TNA, PRO 30-22, 97, Russell to Lord Lyons, 6 February 1864; 2 July 1864, ‘Jack on 
the Crisis’, Punch, or the London Charivari. 
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in Britain, protected by the thickest armour possible—making them very formidable 
ship-killers, despite their slow speed. ‘They might be said to resemble full-armed 
knights riding on donkeys,’ a notable British naval authority later pronounced, ‘easy 
to avoid but bad to close with’.25 As harbour defence vessels they answered a 
growing strategic need throughout the mid-Victorian era to feel more secure against 
potential threats where the British fleet might not be able to intervene in time; so 
the few that were built were sent off to places like Australia and India, as local guard-
dogs (not coincidentally the Australian monitor was named Cerberus). A letter from 
Foreign Secretary Earl Granville to First Lord of the Admiralty George Goschen, 
dated January 10th, 1872, was typical, calling for a monitor at Hong Kong, if only 
because ‘our interests are so enormous, and they may so easily be put into jeopardy 
either by the Chinese themselves, by the French, or by our merchants and 
missionaries’(!) Gladstone’s penny-pinching cabinet, he added, ‘would never consent 
to expensive fortifications there’.26  
 
For coastal assault the recent practical experience in memory was the ‘experiment’ 
with slow-firing turret ships during the Civil War. In a fierce public debate at the 
Royal United Service Institution in 1867, the Controller of the Royal Navy, Vice-
Admiral Robert Spencer Robinson, briefly suggested that shallow-draft turret 
ironclads on the pattern of the Union monitors might be useful for attacking 
fortifications inasmuch as the Federals employed them as cumbersome floating ‘siege 
artillery’ on ‘inland waters’. But the British Nautical Magazine was quick to pick up on 
this point later; ‘that if admittedly so valuable for the important services of attack and 
defence in the Channel, we should possess as yet but two specimens of it adapted to 
such services, since the [Laird Rams] Scorpion and Wyvern, disclaimed by [Captain 
Cowper] Coles, are scouted also by Admiral Robinson’.27 In other words, the 
Controller did not sanction an entire flotilla of monitors during his tenure (1861-
1871) because fighting turrets against forts was not the navy’s priority. The only issue 
of the day was what form ocean-going ironclads would take as capital ships, ‘turret vs. 
broadside’. 
 
This didn’t prevent the occasional grand ‘review’ of volunteer British defences by 
land and sea, designed to thrill tax-paying Victorian spectators rather than as serious 
                                                
25 George A. Ballard (edited by G. A. Osborn and N. A. M. Rodger), The Black 
Battlefleet: A Study of the Capital Ship in Transition (London: Nautical Publishing Co., 
Lymington & the Society for Nautical Research, Greenwich, 1980), pp. 218-19. 
26 TNA, PRO 30-29, 54, Granville to Goschen, 10 January 1872, Granville Papers. 
27 1 May 1867, Cowper Coles, ‘The Turret versus the Broadside System’, extended 
discussion, Journal of the Royal United service Institution, vol. XI (1868), pp. 471-2. 
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wargame exercises in the postmodern sense. An 1869 issue of the Illustrated London 
News therefore depicted the Royal Sovereign and Scorpion—controversial ‘turret ships 
of the future’—staging a ‘bombardment’ of the forts at Dover in an epic two-page 
spread. But the image did not show the 24-foot draught of the Royal Sovereign, 
obliging her to keep a greater distance. The sea that day was choppy, meaning the 
two vessels rolled to the point where any real accuracy would be problematic in the 
extreme—while the forts apparently are not shown firing back. No mines, 
obstructions or defending coastal vessels such as fast rams are present; it’s a straight 
fight between attacking ships and forts.28 What’s also missing is the fact that these 
were two of the only four turret vessels in commission in the Royal Navy at the 
time. Royal Sovereign was a conversion from a wooden line-of-battle ship and Scorpion 
was actually one of the two ‘Laird Rams’ contracted for service in the Confederate 
States Navy during the American Civil War, and purchased by Palmerston’s 
government in 1864 to avoid antagonising Anglo-American relations further. Both 
vessels were armed with slow-firing, 9-inch 12-ton rifled muzzle-loaded Armstrong 
guns—intended to penetrate the armour of enemy ironclads, not attempt to silence 
forts. Significantly, when Chief Constructor of the Royal Navy Sir Edward Reed 
published his monumental treatise on Our Iron-Clad Ships in 1869 he made no 
mention of his breastwork monitors in a coastal attack role. Indeed, he reckoned, ‘if 
we have made a mistake with reference to the introduction into the British Navy of 
turret-ships, and especially of monitors, that mistake has consisted in adopting them 
too rapidly, rather than too slowly’.29 
 
The crunch came the following year when the dangerously unstable sail-and-turret 
HMS Captain—the pride of the ‘fleet of the future’—capsized off Cape Finisterre (6 
September, 1870), taking down most of the crew and Captain’s designer and turret-
ship advocate Cowper Coles. Although Robinson and his department denied 
responsibility for the privately-built vessel’s design it was hard for the public as well 
as the government to accept this explanation as adequate (one of those lost was a 
son of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Hugh Childers). Worse still was that this 
peace-time disaster took place in the midst of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), 
a major conflict on Britain’s doorstep which left many Britons feeling acutely 
exposed. Public and professional sentiment rapidly turned against turret ships. An 
exhaustive Parliamentary inquiry followed which eventually drove Robinson out of 
office in February 1871. But by then events in France drew attention to a startling 
reality: despite having a battlefleet navy second only to Great Britain’s, the French 
                                                
28 10 April 1869, ‘The Volunteer Review at Dover: View of Dover from the Sea—
The Naval Squadron Attacking the Forts’, Illustrated London News. 
29 E. J. Reed, Our Iron-Clad Ships; Their Qualities, Performances, and Cost, with Chapters on 
Turret Ships, Iron-Clad Rams, &c. (London: John Murray, 1869), p. 254. 
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were unable to inflict any damage upon Prussia by sea. There was no coastal assault 
flotilla of light-draft ironclads standing by, any more than there was in Britain.30 The 
Times subsequently condemned the Royal Navy for a chronic lack of preparation. In a 
heated debate in the House of Commons a few weeks later the new First Lord of 
the Admiralty, George Goschen, likewise noted the French fleet’s expedition to the 
North Sea during the recent war was ‘unable to accomplish anything’ while in the 
Opposition pundits like Conservative Rear-Admiral Sir John Dalrymple-Hay critiqued 
the Cyclops class as likely to wind up like the Captain ‘if they venture out of harbour 
into the Atlantic’.31  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the hostile climate, Robinson testified before the 
Parliamentary committee on 10 March, 1871 how his breastwork-monitors might 
indeed be used offensively, ‘for those occasions on which the country might think it 
necessary to send out a great expedition to land an attacking force in shallow water, 
where vessels of great draught of water could no arrive and take their part in an 
action’. But the chair of the committee, Lord Dufferin, pressed the witness about the 
actual pre-planned abilities of the British monitors, ‘if we wished to make an attack 
upon some forts’. When Robinson evasively replied it would be ‘merely wasting your 
time’ to speculate, Dufferin noted: 
 
But is it not questions of this kind which it is our especial object 
to anticipate. We have to prepare in time of peace for 
contingencies which will occur in time of war. It is impossible to 
foresee what maybe the conditions of any particular attack which 
may be made, and, therefore, we are bound to furnish ourselves 
beforehand with the capability of meeting unforeseen 
                                                
30 As noted by British Vice-admiral and naval historian Philip Colomb, it was ‘well 
understood by the French Government in 1870 as ever it had been in former days, 
that the navy alone was practically powerless to make territorial attacks, and that 
whether ships were steam “battleships” or sailing “line-of-battle ships” they did not 
in themselves represent the proper force for conducting territorial attacks’, Naval 
Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated (London: W. H. Allen and 
Co., Limited, 1899, 3rd ed.), p. 427. 
31 7 March 1871, The Times; 27 March 1871, Hansard, vol. 205, cc. 689-734. ‘The 
inaction of the French fleet is a strange feature in the history of the war,’ wondered 
the contemporary Cassell’s History of the War Between France and Germany, 1870-
1871, 2 vols. (London: Cassell & Company, Limited 1873). ‘Considering the immense 
naval superiority of France over Prussia, something, one would think, ought to have 
been performed at sea to redress the disasters of the French on land,’ 1: 23. 
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contingencies. That was the great mistake which France seems to 
have made, and may others have made, and perhaps ourselves, in 
not having provided the necessary means of attack for any 
contingency which might happen? 
 
Robinson’s response was the Admiralty ‘had provided such means of attack as the 
country has thought proper to allow money for…and if we have got too small a navy 
that is the business of the Government of the day…’ In any case, deep water ports 
were accessible to the main British ironclad fleet—‘if not kept out by torpedoes 
[mines]’. For attacking forts approachable through shallow water, the former 
Controller admitted that no armoured vessel currently existed; ‘and I do not know 
that that is a particular want either’.32 Hence, there wasn’t much of a tradition in 
either the Victorian or Edwardian navies to construct a large coastal defence—let 
alone ‘assault’—flotilla of ironclad monitors, or any other purpose-built craft which 
might ‘spearhead’ invasions. It was hard enough, year by excruciating, tax-paying year, 
just to get the naval budgets approved by Parliament without too much fuss from the 
Opposition33—to upgrade and sustain a main battlefleet of deep-draught, Blue-
Water-roving capital ships, with squadrons in the Channel, the Mediterranean, the 
Far East, the Caribbean and so on. Cruisers then took second-place, to show the flag 
and to protect trade across the Empire. It was much easier to invest in local 
defences at home and imperial bases, forts and coastal defence monitors (or 
‘batteries’), and let a potential aggressor try to overcome them from long distances 
which necessarily limited the defensive and offensive capabilities (and costs) of 
attacking warships.  
 
This was not just ‘defence on the cheap’ but deterrence at work in the days of 
Palmerston and Russell, Gladstone and Disraeli, and Salisbury. Responding to public 
criticism that the Royal Navy’s edge was slipping in 1884, First Naval Lord Admiral 
Sir Cooper Key wrote to Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, ‘I should have no fear 
                                                
32 Report of the Committee Appointed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to 
Examine The Designs Upon Which Ships of War Have Recently Been Constructed, with 
Analysis of Evidence (Parliamentary Paper, London, 1872), ‘Minutes of Evidence, Vice-
Admiral Sir Robert Spencer Robinson’, 590, 643-51 (pp. 53-7). 
33 As Robinson noted in an article in 1880, there was always ‘a triumphant reference 
to any item [in the Navy Estimates] on which a diminution can be shown’, Robert 
Spencer Robinson, ‘England as a Naval Power’, The Nineteenth Century, no. 37 (March 
1880), pp. 389-405. Given that the main thrust of this piece was to attack what he 
felt were unwise economies in the Royal Navy in recent years, Robinson was careful 
to list the four Cyclops-class monitors as ‘designed for the protection of ports and 
roadsteads, but not for sea-going purposes’. 
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whatever with France and Russia now, so far as our Navy is concerned’. The ratio of 
first-class (blue-water) ironclads was more than 2:1 over France alone. Yet he had 
‘always deprecated asking for a very large lump sum for shipbuilding purposes—it will 
only induce other Nations to make another start’.34 At the Admiralty’s Foreign 
Intelligence Committee, Captain William Henry Hall’s report of 1884 wanted at least 
85 torpedo boats to help blockade just the major French ports. ‘Cherbourg could 
be, and Lorient might be, successfully bombarded by an armour-clad squadron’, he 
wrote, ‘but Brest and Toulon could successfully resist such an attack, and the 
position of Rochefort renders it impossible by hostile vessels’. But what made 
Cherbourg vulnerable, he noted, was the absence of modern ordnance in the various 
fortifications. Couldn’t these be upgraded with heavier guns fairly quickly? Would ‘six 
ironclads’ really silence the existing (10-inch) guns and destroy the dockyard ‘in one 
day’? Both the experiences of the bombardment of Alexandria two years before and 
the First World War a generation later cast doubt on this assertion. ‘Having the 
essential facts of the last engagement between ships and earthworks at hand,’ 
surmised a printed report on British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1882, by 
Lt.-Commander Caspar F. Goodrich of the U.S. Navy, ‘it is impossible not to draw 
one broad inference—that vessels are not yet and never will be able to fight on even 
terms with forts’.35 At any rate, by December 1893 the naval members of the Board of 
Admiralty declared in a memo that France and Russia ‘as regards their great naval 
ports may be said to be absolutely safe from attack by any fleet which this country 
could bring against them’. This meant an even larger fleet was required, battleships as 
well as cruisers, ‘with no adequate provision against the attacks from the organized 
torpedo-boat system of France’ to even protect commerce in the English Channel. 
The War Office confirmed this assessment a year later, reporting ‘the military ports 
are so well defended that they are considered in France to be unassailable by 
seawards, while the chief commercial ports have in most cases sufficient guns to 
keep all but the heavily armoured ships at a respectful distance’. In particular, shore 
batteries ‘of recent construction are almost invisible from seawards; nothing would 
be more difficult than for ships to engage them with success’.36 
                                                
34 From Parkes, British Battleships, op. cit., 328. 
35 Lieutenant-Commander Caspar F. Goodrich, Report of the British Naval and Military 
Operations in Egypt, 1882, War Series III, ‘Information from Abroad’, Office of Naval 
Intelligence, Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, 1883 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1885), p. 74; original emphasis. 
36 TNA, ADM 231-5, Remarks on a Naval Campaign, by Captain W. H. Hall, R.N., 24 
September 1884, p. 19; TNA, ADM 116-878, ‘Construction of Warships 1893-
1899’—Programme of New Construction, ‘Sir Frederick Richards and other Naval 
Members of Board, December 18 1893’, pp. 20-1; TNA, WO 33-54, Captain Charles 




In terms of the ‘peace needs of the navy’, national and imperial defence always 
overrode a manifestly aggressive British navy capable of inflicting harm without fear 
of injury as far as foreign powers were concerned. Deterrence based on defence, 
carefully shared in a ‘Balance of Power’ international order, was therefore also more 
about détente. ‘No one will complain that we have too many first-class ships, but we 
have no in-shore Squadron worthy of the name’, bemoaned Liberal MP and naval 
advocate Thomas Brassey in March 1878. ‘We are conspicuously deficient in ships 
adapted for attacks on forts and batteries’. Citing a recent paper by Royal Navy 
Captain Cyprian Bridge at the Royal Engineer Institute, Brassey told an indifferent 
House of Commons that even in terms of ammunition it was doubtful the country 
had enough for a massive, sustained naval bombardment of a first-class enemy 
fortification. As a fairly recent example, Union warships at the Siege of Fort Fisher 
(late December 1864 to early January 1865) had expended over 50,000 shells over 
the course of three days. Bridge’s essay was itself almost apologetic to his audience 
of British coastal defence-engineers. ‘Looking back and reviewing the whole question, 
it is not easy to avoid the conviction that to attack a great fortress we should require 
a vast force’, he noted. ‘Heavy ironclads would have to be numbered by dozens, and 
gun-boats and mortar-boats by fifties’. Just as Britain found herself unprepared for 
major littoral operations at the beginning of the Crimean War, it would be ‘the same 
again if we do not recognise the fact that our preparations should be such as to give 
us some promise of successful performance’.37 This must have given Bridge’s listeners 
some grounds for satisfaction, for it was unlikely any other navy in the world was any 
more prepared for coastal offence as opposed to defence. And this, according to 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir William Harcourt in 1894, was as it should be; for 
‘the great mass of the people of this country do believe…the greatest of all British 
interests is peace’ and that ‘the Navy of this country, and indeed the Navies of all 
countries, is principally and before all things not an aggressive but a defensive force’. 
Nations with aggressive forces were land powers not sea powers. Militarism was 
about ‘constantly contemplating, anticipating, and preparing for war’, while modern 
navies in his estimation had ‘ceased to be in a great degree, and have lost in a great 
degree, their aggressive power as compared with what they possessed in former 
days’.38 
                                                                                                                 
à Court, Report on the French Coast defence Organization, illustrated by the Manoeuvres 
on the Channel Coast of France, July, 1894, pp. 8-9. 
37 11 March 1878, ‘Motion for a Select Committee’, Hansard, vol. 238, cc1088-1101; 
‘On the Naval Attack of a Fortress’, Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, 
Royal Engineer Institute Occasional Papers, vol. I, 1877, pp. 190-209. Bridge later went 
on to become Director of Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty (1889-1894). 
38 20 March 1894, Hansard, vol. 22, cc. 738-9. 
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* * * 
 
It is difficult to determine when either Churchill or Fisher was originally inspired by 
monitors—and perhaps how they might have misread the history. One letter from 
Churchill to his American mother Jennie, dated 15 November, 1887 (when Winston 
was but thirteen), asked for ‘General Grant’s History of the American War 
(Illustrated)’ for his birthday. By the time he was twenty-four he informed her of his 
intention of making a living through writing, including ‘a short & dramatic History of 
the American Civil War’.39 Not without irony the first heavy British monitors were 
named—very unusually in Royal Navy practice—after Civil War figures such as 
‘Admiral Farragut’ or ‘Robert E. Lee’. Perhaps this was indeed a conscious nod that 
these vessels were meant to pick up where the Yanks had left off. A leading authority 
on British monitors, Ian Buxton, suggests it was ‘in recognition’ of both the original 
Monitor and the fact that these four emergency war-time monitors, contracted for in 
November 1914 and mounting a pair of 14-inch guns each, received their armament 
from American firm Bethlehem Steel, who had originally built the guns and their 
turrets for the Greek navy (part of a dreadnought battleship it had contracted for in 
Germany before the outbreak of war.) However, far from being flattered the U.S. 
Government thought new British warships named after historic American naval and 
military figures was pushing the limits of friendly international neutrality too far. So 
‘General Grant’ became Havelock, ‘Stonewall Jackson’ became Roberts, Lee became 
Raglan and Farragut became Abercrombie—all proper British 19th-century generals and 
field marshals.40  
 
Fisher doesn’t seem to shown much interest at all in such purpose-built coastal men-
of-war before 1914. His famous 1904 memo-treatise on ‘Naval Necessities’, for 
example, notes instead that ‘To a country like ours a few special vessels for special 
waters are always a necessity, but for serious first-class war the only classes of 
vessels of use, and the only ones that should be provided with crews are: 
battleships…armoured cruisers…torpedo vessels…[and] submarine boats’. In 1906 
he affirmed again that ‘no preponderance in ships of inferior fighting quality can make 
up for a deficiency in ‘capital ships’…at all events to a nation which must be supreme 
                                                
39  CHAR 28/14/28, 15 November 1887, Churchill Papers; Churchill to Lady 
Randolph, 25 April 1898, in Randolph S. Churchill, Youth: Winston S. Churchill 1874-
1900 (London: Mandarin, 1991 version), p. 383. Churchill’s history of the American 
Civil War, finally written when he was in his early eighties, featured in A History of the 
English-Speaking Peoples (1956-58); volume 4, Book XI. 
40 See Ian Buxton, Big Gun Monitors: Design, Construction and Operations 1914-1945 
(Barnsley, Seaforth Publishing, 2012 ed.), pp. 12-21. 
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at sea, an adequate force of modern battleships is essential’.41 That same year Fisher 
had likewise ‘agreed with Sir John French’ that a study penned by Charles Ottley (the 
Director of Naval Intelligence and future secretary of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence) was correct, that the forcing of the Dardanelles was, ‘in the first place, a 
military operation’, and that Turkish defences bolstered by German arms and 
advisors made a strictly naval attempt impossible.42 So when the detailed yet highly 
speculative set of War Plans of 1907 considered at length the idea of attacking the 
German islands of Borkum or Sylt, it did so only as a suggestion of how to lure the 
German battlefleet away from its protected bases out into the open where it might 
be destroyed in a Trafalgar-type decisive battle.43 There was still no discussion of 
torpedo-proof monitors, purpose-built (and long-range) minelayers or sweepers, or 
how increasingly advanced German U-boats might upset the ‘Close Blockade’ 
equation. The ‘War Orders for the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet’, set 
down by Fisher’s secretary Captain Thomas Crease in 1909, likewise specified that in 
order for British destroyers to establish a full-time watch on the German High Seas 
                                                
41  P. K. Kemp (ed.), The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, 2 vols. (London: 
Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co. Ltd., for the Navy Records Society, 1960), vol. 1: 
p. 43; vol. 2, p. 258. 
42 27 July 1906, Fisher to the Earl of Tweedmouth, in Arthur J. Marder (ed.), Fear God 
and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 3 
vols., (London: Jonathan Cape, 1959), vol. 2, p. 84. Fisher had commanded the sail-
and-turret ironclad HMS Inflexible during the British bombardment of Alexandria (11-
13 July, 1882). Inflexible required 11 minutes to reload her mammoth 81-ton guns 
and fire each time. Damage to the Egyptian forts was largely negligible; as with many 
such engagements of the period, Royal Marines did the real work. For the British 
after-action reports see TNA, ADM 116-208, especially report of HMS Penelope to 
Admiral Sir F. Beauchamp P. Seymour, 8 August 1882; Fisher to Seymour, 7 August 
1882. Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister similarly thought in 1895 that if Russia was 
‘able to man the Dardanelles forts with her own men I take it that the place is 
impregnable’. First Lord of the Admiralty George Goschen replied that ‘everybody 
who knows nothing of the defences, the geography and the torpedoes of the 
Dardanelles is of that opinion [‘that the Straits can easily be forced’]. I know scores 
of naval officers quite outside the Admiralty circle including Commanders-in-Chief 
who would be responsible for the operation, who quite disbelieve in it being an easy 
operation, though of course it can be done’, from Thomas J. Spinner, Jr., George 
Joachim Goschen: The Transformation of a Victorian Liberal (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), pp. 198-9. 
43 TNA, ADM 1-8997, in 1933 Captain George A. Ballard responded to criticisms of 
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Fleet, across the North Sea, as well as to expect British submarines to conduct 
offensive operations on the German North Sea coast, that ‘advanced bases should be 
formed’—but as it could not ‘be relied upon that attempts to seize and hold any 
German harbour suitable to the purpose would meet with success’ some form of 
‘floating base’ must be tried, and this at the C-in-C’s discretion only. Upon war-time 
mobilisation, ‘All Torpedo Boats, other than ex-Coastal Destroyers, will remain at 
the Home Ports for local defence’. No force was to enter the Baltic ‘without distinct 
orders to do so’.44  
 
Perhaps it was in reference to these largely defensive arrangements that Fisher in 
March 1909 complained to Reginald McKenna, the First Lord of the Admiralty, of the 
charge by Charles Beresford and other critics that the Admiralty had ‘No War 
Plans’; for there were ‘hundreds & hundreds of pages of print diagnosing every 
German Symptom of War and stating the appropriate treatment’.45 Yet this implied 
mastering a threat, not laying one down, and by 1912 the need for a new class of 
British submarine capable of operating longer distances for great periods than those 
currently in service was considered paramount if a close blockade of German coasts 
was to be considered feasible, according to Captain George A. Ballard, Director of 
Operation Division. A ‘policy of extensive mine laying’ had likewise not received due 
attention, he reported, and ‘at present we have only 7 Mine-layers’.46 
 
It wasn’t just that ‘strategy determined the types of ships to be built’ (another Fisher 
aphorism from another ‘Naval Necessity’) but whether coastal assault as opposed to 
coastal defence was considered as strategically as well as politically viable as coastal 
defence. One case in point concerned Heligoland. At numerous points before and 
                                                
44 National Museum of the Royal Navy (Portsmouth), MS 253/84/3, ‘War Plan G.U.—
War Orders for the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet’, 1909, Crease Papers, 
‘Mobilisation—Coast Defence Flotillas’. 
45 MCKN 6-2, Fisher to McKenna, 31 March 1909, McKenna Papers, Churchill 
Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge 
46 TNA, ADM 116-866B, Ballard memo, 16 September 1912; see also TNA, ADM 1-
8376-111, Ballard’s memo, ‘Responsibility for Removal and Destruction of Enemy 
Mines in positions where Sweeping Vessels do not exist’; and Kemp (ed.), The Papers 
of Admiral Sir John Fisher, op. cit.; with the 1905 committee recommending that no 
‘steps should be taken to provide vessels for laying mines. Suitable ships belonging to 
private companies should be earmarked for this service, in such numbers as to 
ensure a sufficient quantity being always available in home ports…In this way the 
unnecessary expense of the upkeep of such vessels, which would be lying idle in time 
of peace, would be obviated’, vol. 2, pp. 84-90. 
British Journal for Military History, Volume 3, Issue 3, June 2017 
 
97 
after the outbreak of world war, Fisher demurred how this strategic island over forty 
miles off the coast of Germany was given up by Lord Salisbury to the Germans so 
easily in 1890; in exchange for Zanzibar and a controlling interest in East Africa. But 
that Prime Minister was probably informed that holding this key strategic island—so 
far from the British mainland yet so close to the headquarters of the Imperial 
German Navy—was a hopeless proposition. Certainly by 1913, within a year of the 
outbreak of the First World War, a minute by Churchill as First Lord declared it was 
difficult ‘to find any sea front of great natural defensive strength than the German 
North Sea Coast’. Heligoland was ‘an impregnable fortress and an advanced torpedo 
and airship station’, while the islands of Borkum and Sylt were both ‘heavily defended 
by batteries, mine fields, and strong garrisons, and both can be commanded by fire 
from the mainland’.47 Light-draft, heavily-armed and well-protected monitors might 
have successfully navigated many of these natural and man-made obstructions, 
especially if working in close conjunction with long-range destroyers and purpose-
built minesweepers—all supported by cruisers, battlecruisers and battleships as need 
be. Instead, as a recent study by Jan Rüger asserts, Heligoland became ‘a symbol of 
British frustration’ during the First World War—much as Cronstadt had become 
during the Crimean War, and for very similar reasons. 48  At any rate, since 
occupation of the island by treaty in 1814, twenty-four consecutive British 
governments and their associated Boards of Admiralty had obviously chosen not to it 
as a base for ‘forward ops’ against Germany, capable of launching deadly pre-emptive 
strikes at any given moment. This awkward strategic dilemma of British sea power 
repeated itself during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1), when Britain seriously 
considered the possibility of becoming entangled with either combatant, and 
military/naval professionals and the public alike scrutinised, once again, the ability to 
withstand an invasion of the British Isles (i.e., not its ability to somehow counter-
strike the Continent). 49  As historian George Drower has observed, within a 
generation Heligoland and especially the East Frisian Islands off the coast of Saxony 
served as the inspiration for Erskine Childers’ alarmist 1903 ‘espionage’ novel The 
                                                
47 CHAR 13/6A-B, 1913 (undated), Churchill Papers. 
48 Jan Rüger, Heligoland: Britain, Germany, and the Struggle for the North Sea (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 140. 
49 See for example, Richard Millman, British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-
Prussian War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), who noted ‘The apparent 
transformation of British policy in the five years before the war of 1870 was not only 
a manifestation of withdrawal but an estimate of means, an estimate seen as clearly 
by Disraeli as by Gladstone’, p. 224. Millman, however, then stressed ‘the nature and 
degree of English interference were limited by the size of her army’ and ignored the 
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Riddle of the Sands; where the German North Sea islands serve as convenient bases 
for secretly massing the Kaiser’s armada of troop barges for the invasion of Britain’s 
east coast.50 The book was an immediate best-seller, part of a growing public 
appetite for invasion literature already sensationalised, for example, by H. G. Wells’ 
War of the Worlds, published six years before, and emphasising the mortal threat 
posed by radical new technologies which might suddenly exploit British (or indeed 
‘mankind’s’) complacency.51  
 
Some historians have stressed instead a ‘Copenhagen Complex’; one that haunted 
the Germans and spurred the likes of Fisher.52 This is in reference to the surprise 
attack by British Admiral James Gambier’s forces upon the capital of Denmark in 
1807—in order to destroy the neutral Danish fleet before it might be given over to 
Napoleon Bonaparte. Here siege batteries, mortar vessels and some 300 Congreve 
Rockets rained down upon the city for three hellish nights—resulting in thousands of 
civilian casualties—before the defenders finally struck to end the slaughter. 53 
(Gambier was accordingly made a peer; and newcomer Lord Palmerston defended 
the attack in the House of Commons as in accordance with ‘that law of self-
preservation which is a fundamental principle of the law of nations’.54) But whether 
or not serious German naval and military professionals thought such an attack was 
possible in the face of modern combined defences, the more public fear of a ‘pre-
emptive first-strike’ certainly allowed Tirpitz to push ahead with his own 
controversial battleship-building programmes. 55  ‘We absolutely must have that,’ 
                                                
50 George Drower, Heligoland: The True Story of German Bight and the Island that Britain 
Forgot (Stroud: The History Press, 2011), pp. 128-52. 
51 For the role of technology see the analysis by David Morgan-Owen, ‘A Revolution 
in Naval Affairs? Technology, Strategy and British naval Policy in the ‘Fisher Era’’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 38, no. 7, pp. 944-965; also Paul Kennedy, Strategy and 
Diplomacy 1870-1945: Eight Studies (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 
particularly pp. 56-68. 
52  See for example, Jonathan Steinberg, ‘The Copenhagen Complex’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, vol. 1, no. 3 (July 1966), pp. 23-46; also Shawn Grimes, ‘The 
Baltic and Admiralty War Planning, 1906-1907’, Journal of Military History, vol. 74 
(April 2010), pp. 407-37. 
53 See Thomas Munch-Peterson, Defying Napoleon: How Britain Bombarded Copenhagen 
and Seized the Danish Fleet in 1807 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2007), p. 200. 
54 3 February 1808, Hansard, vol. 10, cc. 253-311. 
55 See Gary Weir, Building the Kaiser’s Navy: The Imperial Navy Office and German 
Industry in the von Tirpitz Era 1890-1919 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), pp. 
58-9, 80-1; and Jonathan Steinberg, Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet: 
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protested a German admiral to Lord Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty between 
1900-1905, ‘or all our coast with its rich towns like Hamburg, Bremen, Kiel, Danzig 
etc. would be always at the mercy of the big neighbours east and west, both naval 
powers—one [France] much stronger than Germany and the other [Russia] only 
lately less dangerous in consequence of the [Russo-Japanese] war’.56 The latent 
threat posed by the world’s greatest naval power was here left unspoken. 
 
As for such thoughts in the Admiralty, Arthur Marder noted that ‘Fisher’s jingoism is 
supposed to be proved by his ‘plans’ for a preventive war’. Here he cites the 
memoirs of John Spender, editor of the Westminster Gazette, who reported a 
conversation with Fisher in 1904. The Admiral was boasting about a recent dinner 
with the King, who was merrily told ‘We’ll have a picnic at Kiel. We’ll just go along 
and put two British ships one each side of a German; and then we’ll say to the 
German, as the policeman says to the drunk, ‘Come along quietly and there’ll be no 
trouble, but if you don’t, then there’ll be trouble, and no mistake about it’. ‘ When 
asked what the King thought of that, ‘Fisher looked at me quizzically for a moment, 
and then burst out laughing. ‘The King said, ‘My God, Fisher, you must be mad!’ ‘57 
                                                                                                                 
Yesterday’s Deterrent (London: Macdonald, 1965), pp. 20-1. Steinberg argues Tirpitz’s 
reliance upon ‘Risk Theory’ was dangerously ‘self-confirming’ by provoking a pre-
emptive strike upon German naval power before it became a mortal threat to British 
naval supremacy; ‘a vicious circle in German defence policy’.  
56 D. George Boyce (ed.), The Crisis of British Power: The Imperial and Naval Papers 
of the Second Earl of Selborne, 1895-1910 (London: The Historians’ Press, 1990), p. 
195; see also John H. Maurer, ‘The “Ever-Present Danger”: Winston Churchill’s 
Assessment of the German Naval Challenge before the First World War’, in John H. 
Maurer (ed.), Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas before the World Wars: Essays in 
Honor of Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 7-50. Andrew Lambert 
theorises that Fisher cleverly manipulated the Germans into (unwisely) investing in 
‘coast defences, gun batteries and other local infrastructure upgrades between 1904 
and 1914’ which could have otherwise been invested in more German dreadnoughts 
and thus won Germany the arms race. Unfortunately, no evidence is offered, and it 
seems unlikely Britain would have given up its stated aim to win such a contest; ‘The 
German North Sea Islands, the Kiel Canal and the Danish Narrows in Royal Navy 
thinking and Planning, 1905-1918, in Michael Epkenhams and Gerhard P. Groß (eds.), 
The Danish Straits and German Naval Power 1905-1918 (Potsdam: 
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 2010), pp. 35-62. 
57 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher 
Era 1904-1919, 5 vols. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013 version of 1961 
original), vol. 1, pp. 112-13; Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 
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Marder added he was ‘convinced that the idea was never advanced seriously by 
Fisher, even if he did lament, in his Memories, that ‘we possessed neither a Pitt nor a 
Bismarck to give the order’, for he realized that such action by a British government 
was impossible. It was never considered by the Board and it was never part of British 
naval policy in the Fisher administration’.58  
 
The editor of the Fisher Papers, Peter Kemp, was therefore particularly scathing, 
calling these coastal assault ‘plans’ and the pre-war exercises they had been built 
upon, ‘almost juvenile’ including ‘the ease with which the German admirals were 
outwitted in these war games, and the inevitable annihilation which followed as the 
German fleet fell into the obvious traps set for it. They remind one a little of those 
games of childhood when the youngest member was cast willy nilly in the role of the 
dragon and the elders too turns to slay him in the garb of St. George’.59 Churchill 
himself could only later recount that ‘Shipbuilding had been the greatest passion of 
[Fisher’s] life’ and that thanks to the war ‘all the yards of Britain [were] at his 
disposal and every Treasury barrier broken down’. Indeed, that first autumn of the 
First World War Fisher and Churchill ordered up no less than 7 new battleships and 
battlecruisers, 12 light cruisers, 65 destroyers and 107 sloops and other small 
vessels—all desperately needed for protection against submarines—62 subs of their 
own and some ‘37 monitors’, 18 of which mounted battleship-sized heavy guns. To 
make the idea of a Baltic invasion a real possibility some 240 self-propelled landing 
craft, capable of deploying over 100,000 troops, were also contracted for.60 
 
                                                                                                                 
20; and J. A. Spender, Life, Journalism and Politics, 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. 
Stokes Company, 1927), vol. 2, pp. 67-8. 
58 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 113. 
59 Kemp (ed.), The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 317. Paul Haggie is 
also critical: ‘In sum, the Ballard Committee’s plans show clearly the lack of an agreed 
basis for strategic planning within the navy, and how little notice had been taken of 
the revolutionary developments in sea warfare that marked the latter half of the 
nineteenth century…Not only did opinions remain conflicting within the Admiralty; 
there was no coordination with any outside body, either the War Office, the CID 
[Committee of Imperial Defence] or the French’, ‘The Royal Navy and War Planning 
in the Fisher Era’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 8, no. 2 (July 1973), pp. 113-
131. 
60 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918 (London: Penguin, 2007 version of 
1931 original), pp. 22-3; also Ruddock F. Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 494. 
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Hence the underlying question here is, why not build the monitors, en masse, ready-
trained with a clear operational doctrine worked out in full, well before the outbreak 
of the First World War? Surely Churchill and Fisher knew that anything started in 
the autumn of 1914 up until the last orders of summer 1915 would not be ready for 
at least six months and probably at least a year? (the first 14-inch monitor was 
deployed to the Dardanelles in July 1915, to provide fire support to the troops dug 
in at Gallipoli, while the first 12-inch monitors were bombarding the Belgian coast 
near Zeebrugge a month later) There is a criticism too that not having these vessels 
ready a year earlier—perhaps for a great Baltic thrust against Germany’s north 
flank—or perhaps even to help shore the left flank of the BEF during the ‘Race for 
the Sea’, protect Antwerp, or provide heavy naval fire support to Allied forces at 
First Ypres cost the lives of many men. Indeed, Sir John French telegraphed 
Kitchener on Boxing Day, 1914—as British troops trudged along the Belgian coast 
from Nieuport—for ‘a surprise bombardment by monitors and big gun ships’ if 
possible, ‘as it would have a most beneficial moral and material effect’.61 Neither 
were they ready for Rear-Admiral John de Robeck when he first tried to force the 
Dardanelles with ships alone.  
 
The significance of the nature of the Royal Navy’s monitors during the First World 
War was therefore how they were scrounged up; pre-war plans and naval strategy 
had not decreed these vessels at all. ‘A supply of modern heavy ordnance was the 
main prerequisite for building coast-offence vessels’, notes Iain Buxton, and it was 
thanks to chance that the President of Bethlehem Steel (USA) offered to the Royal 
Navy in early November 1914 the four pairs of 14-inch turret guns he was building 
for the Greek battlecruiser Salamis. The American company was even willing to go 
so far as ‘to supply the charges and the projectiles’. Admiralty specifications for the 
first heavy monitors noted the ‘equipment of the vessel generally is to be of a much 
less extensive nature than is usual in H. M. Service’, and detailed drawings from the 
contractors would not be required for prior approval ‘in this case’.62 Parts for other 
                                                
61 CHAR 13/27A/61, French to Kitchener, 26 December 1914, Churchill Papers. 
62 Buxton, Big Gun Monitors, op. cit., p. 11; DEY/32, Director of Naval Construction 
memo, ‘Appropriation of the 14’ gun turrets and shields building by the Bethlehem 
Steel Co. for a Greek Battleship Cruiser’, 5 November 1914, D’Eyncourt Papers; 
DEY/32, DNC memo, ‘Secret and Confidential’—‘Monitors’—Statement of 
Requirements (Hull), November 1914, D’Eyncourt Papers. British naval architect 
David Brown noted the ‘very simple design study’ of the shallow 14-inch monitor 
hulls entailed blunt ends which increased drag, and which was ‘revealed when the 
lines were sent to Edmund Froude at the Haslar tank but the first ship was laid down 
and it was too late to change,’ The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-
1922 (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2010), p. 146. 
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monitors were to be cannibalised from older RN vessels built or new ones building; 
even 12-inch mortars were considered, as these could be ‘got from U.S.A. in 6 
months, & possibly some larger mortars’. The First Lord of the Admiralty’s note to 
the Director of Naval Construction, Eustace Tennyson D’Eyncourt, of 11 December, 
1914 was quite clear what was at stake: 
 
We now need to make ships which can be built in 6 or 7 months 
at the outside, and which certainly can go close inshore and attack 
the German fleet in its harbours. These are special vessels built for 
a definite war operation and we must look to them in default of a 
general action for giving us the power of forcing a naval decision at 
latest in the autumn of 1915.  
 
If enough heavy guns and their mountings proved too difficult to procure in time, 
Churchill and Fisher then suggested the alternative of vessels armed with four 18-
inch howitzers ‘in separate cupolas sunk low on their heavily-armoured turtle backs’: 
 
They should draw 8 ft at most & be propelled entirely by internal 
combustion engines, at a speed not exceeding 10 knots: no funnels; 
3 or 4 alternative telescopic masts for fire observation; strong 
crinolines 20 ft away all round to make them secure from mine or 
Torpedo.63 
 
Although the First Sea Lord was ‘desolated’ there would be a 60 dead angle in the 
proposed 15-inch gun monitors, D’Eyncourt had already explained all-round fire was 
impossible; steam would also be needed for the pumps, steering engines, capstans, 
etc., in addition to the main engines. ‘There is of course no time to experiment with 
this vessel’.64 
 
After the war it was left to Sir Julian Corbett’s Official History to try to impose, ex 
post facto, a sense of chronological and strategic coherence: 
                                                
63 DEY/32, D’Eyncourt memo, D’Eyncourt Papers, 12 December 1914; DEY/32, 
Churchill to D’Eyncourt, 11 December 1914, D’Eyncourt Papers. See also CHAR 
13/57/106, Fisher to Churchill, 15 April 1915, Churchill Papers. 
64 DEY/32, D’Eyncourt to Fisher, 20 January 1915, D’Eyncourt Papers; DEY/17, 
Fisher’s note is dated 6 March 1915. DEY/40, after the war, D’Eyncourt stressed ‘it 
was necessary…to take in many cases whatever machinery happened to be available 
and in consequence the machinery installations varied somewhat’, undated memo, 
D’Eyncourt Papers. 




Now that the outer seas had been cleared the paramount need 
was to obtain a closer hold on the North Sea, with a view to the 
possibility of ultimately pressing our offensive into the enemy’s 
waters. Such operations would involve coastal attack and inshore 
work, and required a special class of vessel. The necessary 
programme had been inaugurated when Lord Fisher returned to 
the Admiralty, and was being pressed on with energy. The ships 
designed were mainly of the monitor type, made as far as possible 
unsinkable by mine or torpedo, and certain fast ships of battle 
cruiser size lightly protected, but with very heavy gun-power.  
 
But the essential sticking point here followed, that ‘until the programme was well 
forward nothing could be done, and in the meanwhile the enemy might be expected 
to use the opportunity for operating in the North Sea in a way which require the 
utmost activity and vigilance from our fleet’. Any potential naval attack upon 
Zeebrugge was therefore also forestalled ‘until the heavy monitors which were 
under construction were ready’. While the Royal Navy waited, the Admiralty at 
Churchill’s insistence pressed forward for a ‘quick’ attack upon the Dardanelles.65 
Had the monitors been ready even six months earlier the course of the war might 
have been radically altered, although one of the monitors’ designers revealed to 
Admiral Sir Roger Keyes after 1918 that it took greater experience in constructing 
newer types of larger submarines first, otherwise ‘he could never have produced 
our…monitors for use in the war’. As it was, Keyes participated in the Gallipoli 
campaign, once the initial Dardanelles naval effort had failed (18 March, 1915), with 
the Allied fleet ‘anxiously awaiting for the arrival of the torpedo-proof monitors and 
cruisers’, and the ‘Allied Army, pending the arrival of the new divisions…improving 
its position in the southern area by a series of successful though costly offensives, 
under conditions of indescribable discomfort’.66 
 
* * * 
 
Even after Churchill and Fisher ordered the construction of ‘monitors’ in the autumn 
of 1914, and at various points in the war thereafter, it was not clear that they knew 
                                                
65 Sir Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: Naval 
Operations (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), 5 vols., vol. 2, pp. 3-4 & p. 
108. 
66 Roger Keyes, The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes (London: 
Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1934), 2 vols., vol. 1, pp. 37-8 & p. 367. 
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exactly what to do with them.67 Nine days before Rear-Admiral de Robeck took the 
plunge at the Dardanelles, the First Lord of the Admiralty wrote to Admiral Sir John 
Jellicoe, commanding the Grand Fleet, that the first six heavy monitors would be 
ready at the beginning of May (they weren’t) and sent to him for an all-out attack 
against the German North Sea island of Borkum. Some 12,000 troops ferried in oil 
ships ‘converted into unsinkable transports’ were to hold the island against the heavy 
expected German counterassault, along with a quickly-constructed British airbase 
with 60 planes. Churchill assured Jellicoe that within a week the island would be 
captured, British troops dug in, British subs patrolling the Bight in force and an 
effective minefield laid in time for the German High Seas Fleet—if it came out.68  
 
But the week before this, the First Sea Lord had warned Churchill that the success of 
the proposed Borkum operation ‘depends on the efficiency of our arrangements for 
protection against submarines—an effective means of protection is not yet in sight’.69 (Two 
months earlier Jellicoe had likewise expressed grave doubts to Churchill; if nothing 
else, the line of supply would be stretched from the British Isles to the German 
coast, vulnerable to enemy subs and torpedo boats operating from their own main 
base nearby.)70 Nevertheless, within a week of the Dardanelles repulse Churchill 
optimistically persisted with a fresh memo revealing the Borkum operation as only 
the first part of a large plan to then assault the dockyards at Wilhelmshaven and 
Cuxhaven with the monitors, followed by entry of the British battlecruisers into the 
Baltic (assuming the Danes were ‘friendly’ to this movement) and ultimately ‘the 
landing of a British army of invasion, not less than 500,000 strong, at Emden…’ 
Where this kind of force was going to come from, or how the French were going to 
react at this news, wasn’t mentioned. But Churchill was certain that grand 
movements like these would surely persuade Denmark and Holland to join the 
Allies. 71  This factor alone disturbed Asquith, who noted in his diary back in 
                                                
67 See for example, Sir Eustice H. W. Tennyson D’Eyncourt, A Shipbuilder’s Yarn: The 
Record of a Naval Constructor (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1948), pp. 72-3. 
68 CHAR 13/48/58-9, Churchill to Jellicoe, 9 March 1915, Churchill Papers. 
69 3 March 1915, Fisher to Churchill, from Gilbert, Companion vol III, Part 1, op. cit., p. 
622. 
70 CHAR 13/46/12-13, Jellicoe to Churchill, 15 January 1915, Churchill Papers. 
71 CHAR 13/57/86-94, Memo ‘Capture of Borkum’, 24 March 1915, Churchill Papers. 
An Admiralty report of January 1915 had, at any rate, warned of at least 16 defensive 
works on the island (‘widely distributed’ and ‘all small and excellently concealed’), 
including four 12-inch turret guns dug in with a probable range of 24,000 yards; 
TNA, ADM 186-568, Germany: Coast Report. North Sea. Part II: The Coast, Ports and 
Coast Defences, January 1915. 
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December 1914, when Churchill first presented his plan before the War Council, 
that ‘apart from other difficulties, [it] implies either the accession of Denmark to the 
Allies or the violation of her neutrality’.72 
 
In any case, the Dardanelles repulse convinced Fisher that no more units could be 
spared for the Mediterranean, as a failure there ‘would be nothing. A failure in the 
North Sea would be ruin’.73 Three days later, on April 5th, he wrote it was unlikely 
the German High Seas Fleet could be lured out to fight any more than the Grand 
Fleet would risk a battle in the Heligoland Bight; a strategic stalemate in the North 
Sea as well. ‘Under these circumstances’ he followed, ‘any such operations as 
Borkum or Sylt, or Cuxhaven, for which the Monitors are specially designed, 
primarily undertaken with a view to forcing the High Sea[s] Fleet out, must finally be 
abandoned now—and we had better do nothing at all to stir them up’.74 To Lady 
Margaret Asquith he insisted he was ‘always, as you know, against this mad 
expedition [the Dardanelles]’. Borkum ought to have been attacked instead, whereas 
Gallipoli ‘will bleed us white’.75 A parting, grand memo by Churchill on 30 May, 
1915—even as Arthur Balfour took over his post as part of Asquith’s government 
shakeup—could only hope his shiny new Monitor Fleet would ‘be able to play an 
important part in default of all other means in the final phases of the Dardanelles 
operations’ (which of course had at last sparked Fisher’s resignation as First Sea Lord 
and the fall of Churchill himself.)76  
 
Consequently, the resort to these vessels was ‘too little, too late’ for the First 
World War.77 So was any major application of coastal assault. To other interested 
                                                
72 29 December 1914, The Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Memories and Reflections 
1852-1927 (London: Cassell and Company Limited, 1928), 2 vols, vol. 2, pp. 51-2. 
73 CHAR 13/57/97, Fisher to Churchill, 2 April 1915, Churchill Papers. 
74 FISR 5-27, ‘Private and Personal’, 5 April 1915, Fisher Papers. 
75 Michael and Eleanor Brock (eds.), Margot Asquith’s Great War Diary 1914-1916 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2014), pp. 110-11. 
76 ‘The pride of place [Churchill] gave to his monitors and bulged ships in this history, 
is, perhaps, one of the most profound indications of the degree to which these 
vessels, and the bold offensive plans he conceived for them, influenced all his 
strategic thinking during his time as first lord and after’, Graham T. Clews, Churchill’s 
Dilemma: The Real Story Behind the Origins of the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign (Santa 
Barbara: Praeger, 2010), p. 310. 
77 ‘If the monitors were supposed to be the aggressive arm of British sea power,’ 
writes Jim Crossley, ‘that arm was a miniscule one,’ Monitors of the Royal Navy: How 
the Fleet Brought the Great Guns to Bear—The Story of the Monitors in Two World Wars 
(Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2013), pp. 147-50. 
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parties in the Royal Navy, namely Jellicoe, the concern in May 1915 was that old 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson—who had Churchill’s ear since the beginning 
of the war on schemes for capturing a forward base off the German North Sea 
coast—might now be asked to replace Fisher as First Sea Lord. Writing to McKenna, 
Churchill’s predecessor in office, Jellicoe objected how he had already reported on 
the proposal to assault Heligoland as ‘an impossible undertaking’ along with other 
senior naval officers who thought Wilson’s plans absurd and who even ‘doubted Sir 
A’s sanity’. ‘The whole Admiralty war staff were in complete agreement with us,’ he 
added, ‘but he still hankers after it’.78 
 
Once the British monitors were finally deployed their limitations became more 
obvious. If damaged by torpedoes they were still knocked out of action even if they 
didn’t sink, perhaps for months—and dockyard facilities, especially in the 
Mediterranean, were limited.79 There were too few monitors to keep enough on 
station at any one time—and large concentrations of such weapons-platforms were 
required if German defensive batteries were to be suppressed let alone destroyed. 
Although the 12-inch Lord Clive-class monitor General Wolfe was refitted to carry 
one of the 18-inch guns of the Furious (once the decision was made by the Admiralty 
in 1917-18 to convert the battlecruiser to a much more useful aircraft carrier), the 
vessel could only carry sixty high-explosive rounds. And while 90-120 HE rounds was 
common for each of the smaller 12-inch guns, all such naval ordnance had a limited 
life span; Buxton suggests the 15-inch guns of HMS Terror needed replacing in the 
later summer of 1918 after firing ‘about 300 rounds’. As noted by Admiral Reginald 
Bacon of the Dover Patrol, ‘economy of guns’ was therefore a ‘distinct necessity’, 
with ‘the number of rounds fired [being] strictly limited, the total being spread out 
over several days’. This must then be coupled with his assertion that the 
‘mathematical chance of hitting a lock-gate at Zeebrugge from a bombarding 
distance,’ for example, ‘assuming accurate aiming, was once every sixty-seven 
rounds’. Since ‘aiming from a ship at sea can never be assumed to be quite accurate,’ 
he concluded, ‘the chances of hitting from such a moving platform are considerably 
less than the mathematical calculation’.80 As with the Union Navy’s 1860s-versions, 
                                                
78 MCKN 3-22, Jellicoe to McKenna, 23 May 1915, McKenna Papers. For a recent 
defence of Wilson see David Gethin Morgan-Owen, ‘Cooked up in the Dinner 
Hour? Sir Arthur Wilson’s War Plan, Reconsidered’, English Historical Review, vol. 
CXXX, no. 545 (August 2015), pp. 865-906. 
79 Brown, The Grand Fleet, op. cit., p. 148. 
80 See Buxton, Big Gun Monitors, op. cit., pp. 67, 74, 154; Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, 
The Dover Patrol, 2 vols. (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1919), vol. 1, p. 91, p. 98 & p. 
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Britain’s monitors during the First World War were also painfully slow. When 
scrutinising Bacon’s plans for a monitor-led assault on the heavily fortified submarine 
bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend, Keyes ‘could only picture a vulnerable, unhandy [12-
inch] monitor, waddling into that fierce tideway [on the Mole] and hornet’s nest of 
powerful batteries, at a speed of five or six knots at the most, possibly less, 
encumbered as she would be by the false bow and the great weight of the structure 
forward. At that speed, she would be within close range of all the batteries which 
commanded the approach for more than an hour’.81 
 
Hostile operations against the Belgian coast became a cat-and-mouse game, each side 
trying to significantly damage the other usually through ever greater firing ranges and 
accuracy.82 Neither side can be said to have scored a decisive victory; the Germans 
were unable to seriously damage much less sink a heavy British monitor by gunfire, 
nor were the German shore batteries damaged to the point where they had to give 
ground—either failing to protect U-Boat bases or to give Allied ground campaigns 
any distinct advantage.83 D’Eyncourt claimed after the war ‘of all ships carrying heavy 
guns [monitors] were probably more often in action off the Belgian coast and 
elsewhere than any of our heavy-gun ships, and they no doubt gave the enemy in 
occupation of that coast a very anxious time’.84 But neither ‘giving anxiety’ to the 
enemy nor ‘boosting morale’ to British troops on the shore was the raison d’être of 
these specialised vessels. In preparing the monitors for bombarding operations, 
Bacon reported to the Admiralty on 17 December, 1915 that he found ‘no definite 
system of observation of fire or direction fire existed, beyond some vague papers by 
various Officers, which were nebulous in detail’. So he proceeded to develop one, 
largely through trial and error, on the spot. Radio in both directions was crucial, and 
                                                
81 Keyes, Naval Memoirs, op., cit., vol. 2, p. 141; also p. 190. 
82 TNA, ADM 186-568, a direct attack upon German dockyards like Wilhelmshaven 
was largely ruled out during the First World War. As a detailed Admiralty 
intelligence report of February 1915 observed, aside from the High Seas Fleet or 
minefields, any attacking force would have to contend with at least twelve fortified 
shore batteries along the west bank of the Jade—all ‘very difficult indeed to 
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Big Gun Monitors, op. cit., p. 242. 
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this was soon ‘attained with the large seaplane’. But he also considered ‘that at least 
a four months’ instructional course is necessary before a monitor can be looked 
upon as efficient to perform the various duties that she may be called upon to carry 
out’.85  
 
Improved heavy monitors like HMS Terror, mounting 15-inch guns were eventually 
ready for trials by August 1916. These reported speeds finally in excess of 12 knots, 
with rudder improvements for movement astern so the guns could maintain fire 
‘whilst the vessel was retiring out of range’. But the Terror’s war-time career was 
typical of her sister-ships: it wasn’t until the following year that she engaged enemy 
batteries, though she was nevertheless well within their range and soon ‘straddled by 
salvoes’. German airplanes and torpedo-boats were also omnipresent, frequent 
threats. In October 1917 she ran aground, and was abandoned by her crew as she 
filled with water, becoming ‘unmanageable in trough of sea’ until tugs got her safely 
back to Dover for repairs. In February 1918 she returned to resume a long-range 
bombardment of Ostend, noting an engagement with the 11-inch guns of the 
infamous Tirpitz Battery on 10 May, by which time the German had been upgrading 
their Belgian coastal defences with 140 new heavy guns including six 15-inch guns for 
their Deutschland and Leugenboom (‘Pommern’) batteries. The desultory ship vs. 
forts duels continued until the end of the war later that autumn.86  
 
Jellicoe had meanwhile told the Associated Press that U-Boat bases like Zeebrugge 
were a difficult problem. ‘No officer, even before this war, ever believed that it was 
the business of a capital ship to stand up against a land-fort’, he declared, ‘as land 
guns always have greater facilities for finding the range, than a gun mounted in a ship’. 
Shortly after this, on 17 July, 1917 (with losses to German U-boats reaching 500,000 
tons per month), Corbett supplied a distressing memo to the Director of the 
Intelligence Division, confirming from the vantage point of historical study the 
impression that ‘ ‘the use of a fleet by itself to bombard coast defences with the 
object of forcing the enemy fleet to sea or of destroying it inside the defences’ has 
                                                
85 DEY/40, Vice-Admiral Reginald H. Bacon, printed Admiralty Report by Vice-Admiral 
Dover Patrol on Bombarding Operation, 17 December 1915, in D’Eyncourt Papers, iii-iv. 
Director (Dial) Sights had been fitted in the monitors in 1915; see TNA, ADM 186-
19, ‘Monitor Pamphlet’. 
86 TNA, ADM 136-23, HMS Terror Logs; TNA, ADM 186-584, 5, War Supplement to 
Belgium: Coast Report, Section 1. Defences, May 1918. TNA, ADM 137-3705, without 
an experienced aerial spotter in the cockpit, indirect long-range fire was all but 
useless, as noted by a court of inquiry held on board Terror’s sister-ship, HMS Erebus 
at Dunkirk, on 23 December 1917. 
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seldom, if ever, been attempted. Against an effective fleet and effective defences it 
has certainly never been undertaken with success’. If anything, British practice used 
the main fleet to ‘cover such attacks by specially prepared vessels’, although the only 
instance he cited was in 1809 at the Basque Roads and here ‘the fixed defences were 
very weak’.87 By October 1918, a committee was formed to assess the ‘damage done 
on [the] Belgian Coast by bombardments carried out by Monitors’. Yet much of the 
damage discovered by occupying forces had been the work of demolitions set by 
retreating Germans, along with Allied air and land attacks. One local burgomaster 
informed his British visitors that three years earlier the Tirpitz Battery was 
completely engulfed in heavy naval fire—when it ‘suddenly ceased, which, as he said, 
was a great pity, as they had the range absolutely and would soon have destroyed the 
whole Battery’. In the meantime, some ‘400 Belgians [were] killed and about 1,200 
wounded from the effects of [Allied] bombardments and bombs from the air since 
the commencement of the War’.88  
 
All this futile gunfire and random death tended to enrage the British public. 
Outspoken celebrities such as Rudyard Kipling side-swiped the Admiralty in his 
booklet The Fringes of the Fleet, for ‘had we used the Navy’s bare fist instead of its 
gloved hand from the beginning,’ he complained, ‘we could in all likelihood have 
shortened the war’. This alluded to the ‘gloved hand’ of diplomacy—neutrality issues 
associated with the blockade. But the fact that Kipling’s only son, John, had been 
killed the year before at the Battle of Loos (25 September – 14 October, 1915) 
makes his sense of frustration palpable.89 Both Prime Minister Asquith and Labour 
cabinet member Arthur Henderson lost their eldest sons the following September at 
the Battle of Flers–Courcelett; the Somme. Fisher, too, loudly proclaimed that the 
Admiralty (without his sole guidance) was relying upon a slow strangulation of 
Germany when his ‘Baltic Plan’ might still end the war within weeks. ‘The present 
direction of the War at Sea’, he wrote in April 1916 (from his relatively dismal 
vantage point chairing the new Board of Invention and Research), ‘shows an utter 
lack of Audacity and Imagination, and clearly there is no Plan of War whatever’. But 
of course, by then few people were willing to take the old sailor seriously, 
particularly the army which had already committed itself in mud and blood on the 
Western Front and had carefully slipped out of Gallipoli the previous December. 
Now the deadly U-boat offensive against British shipping reemphasised the great 
                                                
87 FISR 5-31, 12 April 1917, in Fisher Papers; TNA, ADM 1-8492-154, Corbett to 
Captain William Reginald Hall, 16 July 1917. 
88 TNA, ADM 1-8557-126, 28 October 1918. 
89 From Rudyard Kipling, Sea Warfare, (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1916), 
pp. 89-90. See also David Gilmour, The Long Recessional: The Imperial Life of Rudyard 
Kipling (London: Pimlico, 2003), pp. 116-17, 204-6, 264. 
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opportunities Fisher thought had been missed and which ‘would have come off’, he 
insisted, ‘except for the Dardanelles which blasted the Plan’.90 By June 1917, and with 
the American fleet on board, Fisher wrote to Prime Minister Lloyd George how it 
was ‘just exasperating that, with our really astounding Naval supremacy, the 
Admiralty Policy should be solely to ‘hold the ring’!’ As he had said at the outbreak 
of the war, ‘so far as the British Navy is concerned the British Army might as well be 
in Timbuctoo! And yet never in History was ever the opportunity so great as in the 
present War for a great Amphibian operation in Northern waters and one so 
certainly to end the War!’ Here he blamed ‘Politics’, and the decision to send the 
BEF to France instead of to Antwerp.91  
 
One influential person willing to openly disagree with the increasingly cantankerous 
Fisher (77 years old by 1918) was Maurice Hankey, Secretary to Lloyd George’s War 
Cabinet as well as the Imperial War Cabinet. On 21 February, 1918 he wrote the 
former First Sea Lord that committing the BEF to France was surely also about how 
‘the moral effect of our force on the French nation [which] may have been out of 
proportion to its material effect’. Furthermore, he was now ‘very doubtful…whether 
the conditions could ever have been arrived at which would have enabled our forces 
to act against Berlin in the manner you contemplate’.92 
                                                
90 FISR 5-30, ‘Memorandum on the Conduct of the War’, 12 April 1916, Fisher 
Papers. As Rhodri Williams concludes in Defending the Empire: The Conservative Party 
and British Defence Policy 1899-1915 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), Fisher 
as First Sea Lord with Churchill’s successor Balfour as First Lord might have been a 
‘dream ticket’, but Fisher had already made it clear he was unwilling to work with 
anyone, while ‘his impetuous act of resignation had convinced Asquith that he was no 
longer fit for his post’, p. 233. 
91 FISR 5-30, 1917 undated memo, Fisher Papers. For an interesting analysis of the 
British ‘continental’ strategy’s ascendancy over the traditional ‘maritime school’ by 
1914 see Nicholas d’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy: Defence Administration 
in Peacetime Britain 1902-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); also T. G. 
Otte, ‘“The Method in which we were schooled by Experience”: British Strategy and 
a Continental Commitment before 1914’, in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (eds.), 
The British Way in Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856-1956 (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2010), pp. 301-23. 
92 HNKY 5-2B, Hankey to Fisher, 21 February 1918, Hankey Papers, Churchill 
Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge. Hankey later 
recounted that ‘As early as 1906 I had formed the opinion that the plan could not be 
accomplished unless carried out as a coup de main at the very outset of the war’, 
Lord Hankey, The Supreme Command: 1914-1918 (London: George Allen and Unwin 




This, perhaps, is what it ultimately came down to: the mind-set behind the machine. 
Almost as soon as these concepts reached their zenith new and fatal threats became 
real. The Times of August 12th, 1916, for example, noted German seaplanes had 
conducted bombing attacks upon British monitors off the Flemish coast. ‘It may be 
that before this war is done’, the Times reflected a month later, when reporting the 
first use of tanks during the final Somme offensive, ‘[that] we, the Germans, and all 
the Allies alike shall be building other monsters, huger and each more horrific than 
the last, till there are land battles of whole fleets of dreadnoughts and terrestrial 
monitors. But what is obvious at the moment is that we have done it first. This time 
the diabolical machine is ours—our own’.93 This is what the war had been doing to 
people: breaking down the traditional restraints, escalating not just the scale and 
intensity of violence but the ingenuity of it all—the ruthlessness born of rage, the rage 
born of frustration, and loss. Since when did respectable Edwardians now pride 
themselves on building ‘diabolical monsters’? The Times quickly added of course that 
‘we have used nothing which is not entirely civilized and in accord with every 
convention that was ever signed’. But did the British public really need this to be 
announced; that while they considered ads for ‘Fine Chinaware’, ‘Albion’ motorcars 
and ‘Plasmon Oats’, on the same page, the country was churning out massive new 
killing machines with a clear conscience? 
 
Fisher himself by the end of the war was locked away devising his newest expression 
of British supremacy: a ‘submersible battleship’; a submarine armed with eight 20-inch 
calibre guns. As soon as he was out of office (in disgrace) in the spring of 1915, and 
worrying about how history would partially lay the blame for the Dardanelles and 
Gallipoli upon him as well as Churchill, he listed the main advantages of his new 
weapon concept, including: 
 
• ‘Excellent ships for bombarding open towns’. 
• ‘Immense endurance, should easily be capable of operating away from her 
base for a year’. 




                                                                                                                 
Limited, 1961), 2 vols.,1, pp. 241-2. He mistakenly noted that ‘Men-of-war, save in 
exceptional cases such as monitors, are not built to engage land forts’ (vol. 1, pp. 30-
1), inasmuch as the original monitors of the American Civil War, with their slow-
firing ultra-heavy ordnance, were not built for this role. 
93 The Times, 12 August 1916 and 19 September 1916. 
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‘As our next war will be either with America or Japan and her allies, this design of 
ship is ideal for establishing a close blockade of their coasts, the water around their 
coasts being too deep for mines, so that submarines would be the chief danger’.94 
This rather echoed the pre-war sentiments of Captain Archibald G. H. W. Moore, in 
command of Fisher’s pride and joy, HMS Dreadnought, who was fully prepared ‘to 
bombard coast towns’ since ‘the more you made the people of a country suffer’ the 
sooner a war would end.95  
 
This was also why there were no monitors before such a war—whether in the early 
1860s or the early 1900s—why they were built in such haste and used quite 
haphazardly in both the American Civil War and the First World War. In the former 
conflict, they were built for coast defence then thrown into a coast assault role for 
which they proved ill-suited; in the latter, they were re-imagined for coast assault yet 
wound up largely in defensive stations, where they ‘guarded Calais against blocking 
and helped to defend the Downs against night raids by destroyers’, for example. 
They even ‘lined the entrance to the Thames to intercept Zeppelins’, thus serving 
somewhat ignominiously as stationary anti-aircraft batteries.96 Likewise, in the early 
1860s, monitors as ship-killers proved effective against larger opponents by 
maximising weight for mounting the heaviest naval ordnance possible, behind 
concentrated armour thicknesses up to fifteen-inches, in the case of the USS Dictator 
(launched in 1863). But on 20 January 1918, the 14-inch monitor HMS Raglan, along 
with the 9.2-inch monitor M28, was quickly overwhelmed at Imbros near the 
Dardanelles by former German battlecruiser Goeben (renamed Yavuz Sultan Selim), 
mounting ten 11-inch guns, and the light cruiser Breslau.97 In 1866 it could still be 
                                                
94 FISR 5-42; 5-29, Fisher Papers. 
95 Arthur J. Marder (ed.) Portrait of an Admiral: Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1952), entry dated 2 May 1909, pp. 49-50. 
96 Bacon, The Dover Patrol, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 30-1. ‘Monitors, which are vessels of 
offence, built for that purpose,’ declared Captain Herbert Richmond of the Admiralty 
staff to Lloyd George in June 1917, ‘are employed defensively in the Humber, at 
Yarmouth & so on, where they are useless’. Instead, he wrote, they ought to have 
been used ‘assisting to destroy Zeebrugge, helping the Italians off Duino, or 
operating with troops & air craft off the Syrian coast,’ from Marder, Portrait of an 
Admiral, op. cit., p. 255; see also Keyes, Memoirs, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 160 & p. 162. 
97  TNA, ADM 1-8513, 32, for the Battle of Imbros (20 January 1918) see 
‘Dardanelles—HMS Raglan and H.M. Monitor M28’; also Buxton, Big Gun Monitors, 
op. cit., pp. 36-40. After quickly knocking out Raglan’s director top, one shot 
penetrated the eight-inch barbette armour below her turret, igniting the charges of 
both guns before she could get off her third shot. Buxton notes that with Breslau 
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argued that given a set displacement and weight, a monitor offered much better 
protection and hitting power than any other weapons-platform including sail-and-
turret ironclads like HMS Monarch (1868) or breastwork-monitors with their raised 
decks and superstructures.98 But even as they are rightly seen by historians as the 
progenitures of the modern ‘all big-gun battleship’99, clearly in the First World War 
their original function if not semi-aquatic form had passed to the (fully-submerged), 
torpedo-firing submarine. So the Germans used them to massacre merchantmen as 
well as men-of-war, and Fisher relished the thought of his submersible battleships 
finally going where men-of-war couldn’t, and threatening soft targets with mass 
destruction. 
 
This was why Robinson in 1871 could only respond to the charge that he had not 
built enough of them, to be used offensively (and pre-emptively at that), by inferring 
it was simply not British policy to do so. When German battlecruisers lashed out 
against the British northeast coast, bombarding Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby 
on 16 December, 1914, Captain Herbert Richmond of the Admiralty naval staff 
fumed how ‘this ‘insulting the enemy’s coasts’ is really quite out of date, apart from 
any questions of The Hague Convention, which lay down that the bombardment of 
undefended towns is forbidden…’ Nothing could be more stupid on the part of their 
enemy, especially since it would ‘further strengthen American feelings against them, 
already very strong’.100 In this sense it was far better to hold the moral high ground, 
patiently in defence, than risk desperate technological shortcuts, whether 
unrestricted U-boat warfare to starve Britain into submission, gas attacks, or 
monitor-led raids to send the Germans fleeing in terror from their own shores. As 
noted by Christopher M. Bell, initial objections to the proposed Dardanelles 
campaign outlined by Churchill included that of Admiral Henry Jackson, whose 
memo questioned what use even if the British fleet reached Constantinople? Shelling 
the enemy capital ‘probably result in discriminatory massacres’ and even militarily 
                                                                                                                 
having struck a mine shortly afterwards and Goeben damaged as well the battle was 
not a complete loss for the Royal Navy.  
98 See for example, 3 April 1866, Ericsson to British engineer John Bourne, Ericsson 
Papers, Philadelphia; and 1 May 1867, Fox to Ericsson, Ericsson Papers, Library of 
Congress. 
99  The seagoing breastwork-monitor HMS Devastation ‘spoilt the monitor idea’, 
observed K. C. Barnaby in The Institution of Naval Architects 1860-1960: An Historical 
Survey of the Institution’s Transactions and Activities over 100 Years (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, Limited, 1960). ‘Few ships have aroused more controversy, but 
they were the starting-point of an entirely new era in British warship design,’ p. 60. 
100 Bacon, The Dover Patrol, op. cit., entry dated 16 December, 1914, vol. 1, p. 131. 
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was not as effective as occupying it.101 ‘Of course, had we been Germans,’ noted 
Bacon after the war, in his chapter on ‘Coastal Bombardments’ in The Dover Patrol, 
‘the town of Ostend could have been reduced practically to pulp without a single 
shore gun being able to reply’.102 Although tucked away in a footnote, the historical 
significance of this statement needs redressing.  
 
On the other hand, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Wester-Wemyss at the end of March 
1915 grumbled that the Dardanelles ‘needn’t have been half so hard had there been 
any sort of preparation at home’; ‘Amateur strategists and amateur warriors is what 
we are suffering from…’ Indeed, the whole campaign had been conceived, he wrote, 
despite professional doubts and despite military assistance. ‘Never was war waged in 
a more half-hearted manner’.103 But the premeditated resort to ‘close blockade’, like 
coastal assault itself, carried a high price few were prepared to pay. As one British 
naval officer and analyst shrewdly observed:  
 
There can be no reasonable doubt that an attempt to enforce a 
close blockade would have resulted in very heavy loss, and, if 
persisted in, the ruin of the Allied cause. Nor did Sir John Fisher, 
[Arthur Wilson’s] predecessor, stand on firmer ground, for he also 
favoured a close blockade, and in a letter dated the 6th of June 
1911, described the old shibboleth ‘England’s frontier is the coast-
line of the enemy’ as a great fundamental truth vital to British policy. 
His plan for landing an army on the German Baltic coast illustrates, 
even more clearly, the risks we ran in the sphere of naval 
strategy…Huge sums were wasted in building special ships, but they 
were cheap at the price provided the operation was never carried 
out.104 
                                                
101 Christopher M. Bell, Churchill and Sea Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), p. 63. 
102 Bacon, The Dover Patrol, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 85; TNA, ADM 1-8557-126, such a no 
holds barred-attack, however, would not necessarily have damaged the locks any 
more than previous efforts. By contrast, British observers at Ostend after the war 
were surprised to learn the Germans were fairly benevolent occupiers, and ‘the 
inhabitants, especially the children, seemed to be fat and well-fed’, 28 October 1918 
report. 
103 Admiral of the Fleet Lord Wester-Wemyss, The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign 
(Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., 2010), pp. 51, 264. 
104 Vice-Admiral Kenneth Gilbert Balmain Dewar, The Navy from Within (London: 
Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1939), pp. 144-5. In the autumn of 1914 the influential political 




Nevertheless, not only did Churchill state the monitors’ and tanks’ usefulness had 
been ‘largely thrown away’ by the various commanders-in-chief, but the monitors in 
particular (‘the original types of which were no doubt far from perfect’) ‘were not 
developed, and were never employed as a part of any great naval offensive…’105 In 
terms of British government policy and Admiralty war planning, Fisher thus moaned 
to Hankey of both as a positive nuisance which crippled the nation: ‘It’s the 
‘personality’ that takes the matter in hand with the powers of a Dictator! Do you 
imagine that those 612 vessels that were started in the Autumn of 1914 would ever 
have been either begun or completed in practically 12 months had a ‘Committee’ 
been in charge or without supreme personal direction’.106 
 
* * * 
 
And yet the Allies won the war. The British not only emerged triumphant but in 
character. ‘You thought to win by trickery and by methods underhand. The teachings 
of sound strategy you could never understand,’ went a war-time poem deriding 
German policies. ‘We filled all the seas with commerce, our fleet held yours fast at 
bay. You might have waged a gallant war; but you chose the other way!’107 Even so, 
                                                                                                                 
figure (2nd) Viscount Esher wrote in his journal that ‘undoubtedly the country will 
benefit by having Fisher and Wilson back again in the Admiralty. More driving power 
was required, and they will supply it’; but following visits to the Admiralty with ‘Jacky 
Fisher’ and Arthur Balfour in early 1915 Esher’s expectations had lowered, as ‘every 
member…had a different plan; it is like a game of ninepins; one plan is knocked over, 
and, in falling, knocks over the next one, and so on until the board is clear; the result 
is a total want of initiative of any kind’; entries dated 4 November 1914 and 13 
January 1915, from Viscount Esher Oliver (ed.), Journals and Letters of Reginald 
Viscount Esher, 4 vols. (London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson, 1938), vol. 3, p. 194 & p. 
203. 
105 Churchill, The World Crisis, op. cit., p. 304. 
106 HNKY 5-2B, Fisher to Hankey, undated, possibly 1917, Hankey Papers. Hankey 
later condemned Fisher’s ‘exaggerated desire for power’ as an underlying character 
flaw which persisted in the building of his Baltic flotilla—including monitors—even 
after British policy was committed to the BEF in France; Stephen Roskill, Hankey: 
Man of Secrets, Volume I 1877-1918, 3 vols. (London: Collins, 1970), vol. 1, p. 153. 
107 Bacon, The Dover Patrol, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 74. In Bacon’s strategic analysis the 
Germans operating from Ostend and Zeebrugge could have rushed the Dover Patrol 
at any time with their superior numbers of destroyers, while despatching fast 
commerce raiders through the gauntlet to harry British trade throughout the 
empire, thereby drawing off and dividing British naval units from the North Sea. Yet 
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the overriding danger before the war and throughout much of the previous century, 
wrote German-born British diplomat Sir Eyre Crowe, had always been the jealousy of 
Britain’s seapower which led to coalitions against her: ‘The danger can in practice 
only be averted on condition that the national policy of the insular and naval State is 
so directed as to harmonize with the general desires and ideals common to all 
mankind, and more particularly that it is closely identified with the primary and vital 
interests of a majority, or as many as possible, of the other nations’.108 Small wonder 
then, that soon after the Monitor fought the Merrimack (the CSS Virginia) to a 
standstill, on 9 March, 1862, a score of smaller powers in Europe—but also including 
Russia—invested heavily in monitors as well; to ensure their coasts were not 
England’s frontier, and at no loss to England herself.109  
                                                                                                                 
he also acknowledged that anything more than a ‘tip and run raid’ was impossible 
against British reinforcements, while raiders risked being cut off from returning to 
their base. As long as Britain could replace lost naval units better than Germany the 
latter could not afford ‘unstinted loss of war-ships, for the mastery of the sea’. 
Tirpitz, from his perspective, wrote that he was ‘not strong enough’ to secure for 
German naval forces in the Flemish ports ‘sufficient accessions of force from home 
to make them as powerful as Admiral [Ludwig von] Schroder and I could have 
wished,’ yet they were ‘a sharp thorn in England’s side right up to the autumn of 
1918’, Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, My Memoirs (New York: Dodd, Mead and 
Company, 1919), 2 vols., vol. 2, p. 80. Admiral Reinhard Scheer was specifically 
dismissive of the British monitors, which had ‘not once succeeded in inflicting serious 
damage, though they had made many attempts’, Germany’s High Sea Fleet in the World 
War (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1920), p. 339. 
108 Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1946), Appendix VII, ‘Sir Eyre Crowe on Sea Power and Policy’, p. 355; see 
also Keith Jeffrey, ‘British Strategy and War Aims in the First World War’, in 
Herausgegeben von Holger Afflerback (ed.), The Purpose of the First World War 
(Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015), pp. 45-60. 
109 See for example, ‘The ‘Monitor’ Iron-Clads—Opinion of the Russian Admiral’ 
[Lesoffsky], May 1864, translated from ‘a semi-official periodical published at St. 
Petersburgh’. U.S. Navy Department Library-archives, Washington Navy Yard, ‘Civil 
War pamphlets’, W14. ‘The Monitors that are being constructed at the Petersburg 
yards undoubtedly are not in a condition to cope with Cherbourg, or to take 
Portsmouth [‘for fight against fortresses they are nearly useless’]; but they will perform 
their party of duty, and will be of such use as to prevent an unmolested 
bombardment of the fortifications of the port of Cronstadt, which are so important 
to Russia’. By 1873 thirteen light-draft monitors and turret ships armed with Russian-
built, 9-inch breechloading rifled guns on the Krupp design (comparable to the hitting 




What caught the Admiralty by surprise in 1914 was that coast defence had been a 
deliberate strategic policy for decades—from Palmerston’s forts to ironclad 
monitors—while coast assault had not. Take for instance, in closing, Churchill’s 
cabinet memo of 7 July, 1917; bitter how easy it was for the experts ‘to remain 
entrenched upon a negative policy, and receive every proposal with a fire of 
destructive criticism’. The ‘old, recognised, true war policy of the Royal Navy’, he 
argued, was settled on the ‘fundamental principle of aggressive naval strategy’; of 
close blockade, and more. This meant capturing a German North Sea island, for 
which new squadrons of ‘torpedo-proof’ vessels, supported by full command of the 
air for accurate shore bombardment of dug-in enemy batteries, would be crucial. A 
division of troops, maybe two, was also required. Only then could enemy naval 
forces be ‘beaten back into port’. To seal them in, ‘dense minefields’ would then have 
to be layered over all approaches, over and over. And yet his plan concluded with a 
political gamble: Denmark would then have to join the Allies. ‘Until she comes in, it is 
unwise, if not impossible, to enter the Baltic’. (Presumably, Germany’s northern flank 
could then be threatened directly, at last.) It was exhausting. Churchill seems to have 
completely forgotten the Dardanelles and the Gallipoli campaign. How long would 
such a combined force take to assemble? How much would it cost? How might the 
Germans augment their own defences in the meantime? These were questions the 
memo didn’t address, in the context of a war seemingly—and self-fulfillingly—
without end. But if Churchill’s maligned ‘expert opinion’ decided once again ‘that no 
means of a naval offensive exist or can be devised; that the war can only be won on 
land, and that the Allied navies, however great their superiority, can only “keep the 
ring” and hunt submarines with small craft’, he challenged, then ‘the proportion of 
Allied resources in men, money, and material which should be assigned to the 
upkeep of the battlefleets stands clearly in need of the strictest scrutiny.”110 This was 
unintentionally ironic, for it would bring the establishment of the Royal Navy back to 
where it had always been, to its so-called ‘negative policy’—its sensibility. Perhaps 
the successful prosecution of the ‘Great War’ really was about making the enemy 
suffer, with the total remorselessness of a fully-mobilised machine; from coldly pre-
prepared, pre-emptive strikes to brutal and indiscriminate violations of all kinds. Yet 
the essence of the antebellum ‘Pax’, epitomised by the Royal Navy’s ‘gobbies’ 
scattered around the empire and in perennial deep-freeze at home, was in assuring 
rival powers that the British would be shocked to the core if it ever came to that.  
 
                                                                                                                 
power of Armstrong 12-ton guns, which could penetrate 9½-inches of iron armour 
at 1,000 yards) complimented Cronstadt’s combined defences. 
110 MCKN 7-1, Naval War Policy, 1917, 7 July 1917, McKenna Papers. Churchill was 
appointed Minister of Munitions as part of Lloyd George’s government. 
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Kipling’s complaint was certainly understandable, but gentlemen do not fight with 
their bare fists. 
 
  






John Ericsson’s early ‘monitor’ designs, developed during the Crimean War but 
fulfilled in the final design of the U.S.S Monitor, launched in early 1862, from William 





Fisher’s plans for a ‘submarine battleship, circa 1917-18, to be armed with eight 20-
inch guns, courtesy of the Churchill Archives Centre (abbreviation: CAC), The 
Papers of 1st Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, FISR 5/42.  
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‘Sea Monsters that are Dreaded by the Huns’, The Graphic, 12 October, 1918—
author’s collection: 
 
The British public was fascinated by new weapons which promised to break the 
deadlock of the Western Front and win the war quickly and decisively.  Despite 
the illustration’s claims, the Germans had not relaxed their grip on the Belgian 
coast but had improved their defences with heavier shore guns capable of firing 
at greater ranges.  





‘Fighting the Mine and the Torpedo’, The Graphic, 1 February, 1919—author’s 
collection 
 
 
